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Abstract
Climate change and the transition to a low-carbon economy involve the financial system 
in two ways. First, because it channels the funds needed to make the large investments 
to comply with the Paris Agreement. Recent years have seen headway, albeit insufficient, 
in the development of new products, of which green bonds are the most advanced green 
financing instrument. Second, because of the financial risks associated with climate change 
and the transition to a low-carbon economy, which affect financial institutions’ balance 
sheets and are, moreover, systemic. This means that financial institutions have to assess 
these risks and their exposure to both of them, although it is not an easy task. There are 
still obstacles and challenges to overcome, such as the lack of a complete taxonomy that 
comprises what is “green” and what is not green, the lack of information on and knowledge 
of appropriate methodologies, and the long and uncertain time horizon of these risks, which 
calls for rolling out new skills and integrating these risks in the whole of the organisation, as 
well as taking a forward-looking approach. Lastly, central banks’ responsibilities regarding 
bank supervision, financial stability, asset management and monetary policy also make it 
necessary for them to analyse the potential systemic implications they may have for the 
economy and the financial system as a whole in order to incorporate climate-change issues 
into their supervisory and macro-prudential practices, into the portfolio management of their 
own portfolios, and, within their mandates, in their monetary policy framework. The progress 
made in recent years by financial markets, financial institutions and central banks has been 
significant although there is still a way to go. 
Keywords: climate change, financial risks, financial stability, green bonds, central banks, 
sustainable finance.
JEL classification: G10, G20, E58, Q50.
Resumen
El cambio climático y la transición a una economía baja en carbono implican al sistema 
financiero mediante dos vías. Primero, por su papel de canalizador de la financiación 
necesaria para realizar las cuantiosas inversiones que requiere el cumplimiento del Acuerdo 
de París. En los últimos años se han producido avances —aún insuficientes— en el 
desarrollo de nuevos productos, siendo los bonos verdes el instrumento de financiación 
verde más avanzado. Segundo, por los riesgos financieros que el cambio climático y la 
transición hacia una economía de bajo carbono implican, los cuales afectan al balance de 
las entidades financieras y tienen, además, una naturaleza sistémica. Esto significa que las 
instituciones financieras han de evaluar estos riesgos y su exposición a ambos, aunque no 
es una tarea fácil. Todavía hay obstáculos y retos que superar, como la falta de una taxonomía 
completa que comprenda lo que es «verde» y lo que no lo es, la falta de información y de 
conocimiento de las metodologías apropiadas, y el largo e incierto horizonte temporal de 
estos riesgos, que exige el desarrollo de nuevas competencias y la integración de estos 
riesgos en el conjunto de la organización, así como la adopción de un enfoque prospectivo. 
Por último, las responsabilidades de los bancos centrales en materia de supervisión 
bancaria, estabilidad financiera, gestión de activos y política monetaria también hacen 
necesario analizar las posibles implicaciones sistémicas que pueden tener para la economía 
y el sistema financiero en su conjunto, con el fin de incorporar las cuestiones relativas al 
cambio climático en sus prácticas de supervisión y macroprudenciales, en la gestión de sus 
propias carteras y, dentro de sus mandatos, en su marco de política monetaria. Los avances 
realizados en los últimos años por los mercados financieros, las instituciones financieras y 
los bancos centrales han sido significativos, aunque todavía queda camino por recorrer.
Palabras clave: cambio climático, riesgos financieros, estabilidad financiera, bonos verdes, 
bancos centrales, finanzas sostenibles.
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1 Introduction
Currently, there is a broad consensus that global warming of more than 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels will have economic and social consequences of considerable importance. Since the end 
of the Second World War, notable changes have been occurring, characterised by a rise 
in the temperature of the atmosphere and oceans, a decrease in the icecap and a higher 
sea level, as pointed out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)1 in its 
fifth assessment report (IPCC, 2014). According to the IPCC, we have already reached 1°C 
warming above pre-industrial levels (with a range between 0.8°C and 1.2°C) and all the 
paths considered entail an increase in temperature during the 21st century. At the current 
rate, warming of 1.5°C will be reached between 2030 and 2052 (IPCC, 2018) and the human 
influence has led to warm the atmosphere, ocean and land (IPCC, 2021). The Earth’s 
average global surface temperatures in 2020 matched those of 2016, making the two 
years tied as the warmest on record (NASA, 2021).2 According to ESPON Climate (2011), 
the countries of the south of Europe would present a higher potential impact of climate 
change and lesser capacity to adapt to it (see Chart 1).
To limit the temperature, it will be necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
through resolute and effective climate policies. The implications of climate change are broad 
and encompass many areas at the economic and social levels. The signature in 2015 of the 
Paris Agreement and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development marked 
the starting point for countries to join forces and launch a programme of activities designed to 
prevent temperatures from rising more than 2ºC above pre-industrial levels and move towards 
a fully decarbonised economy. This objective, along with that of mobilising the necessary 
resources, is what is driving the various institutional measures and initiatives being taken.
The transition to a low-carbon economy entails structural economic changes which 
affect practically all economic sectors and activities and require large-scale mobilisation of 
financial resources and hence the involvement of the financial sector in the flow of funds from 
savers to the necessary investment projects. At present there are various estimates, based 
on different scenarios and sector coverages, of the volume of financing needed to achieve 
the goal of net zero emissions by 2050. Nevertheless, most estimates show that the average 
global annual investment would have to exceed $4 trillion per year over the coming decades 
to achieve the net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050. Against this background, recent years have 
seen the development of new green financing instruments, of which green bonds are the 
most advanced. Since the first issue by the European Investment Bank in 2007, the market 
has been increasingly active since 2014, when the Green Bond Principles were published, 
1   The IPCC or Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is a scientific body created in 1988 by the World Meteorological 
Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. Its objective is to provide governments at all levels 
with scientific information which can be used in the development of climate policies. The analyses are conducted by 
hundreds of scientists who make voluntary contributions on the impact of climate change and on future risks and how 
they can be reduced by adaptation and mitigation initiatives.
2   In the case of Spain, an analysis by the Spanish Weather Agency (AEMET, 2019) shows that the frequency and intensity 
of anomalous heating events have increased in the last few decades and 2020 was the warmest year in Spain where 
the temperature has risen 1.7 ºC since pre-industrial times, and 1.3 ºC in the last 60 years (AEMET, 2020).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2126
with a cumulative issuance over $1.4 trillion by September 2021 and an outstanding nominal 
over $1.1 trillion. Most frequent issuers are corporates, financial institutions, supranational 
entities and, more recently, sovereign treasuries.
Regarding climate change, financial institutions face both opportunities and risks. 
On the opportunity side, the channelling of funds needed for the transition represents a 
business opportunity. Thus banks are becoming active in the issuance of green bonds, 
syndicated loans and project finance, and are beginning to offer various services relating to 
green finance, such as the placement of issues, the opening of special facilities, assessment, 
valuation, etc. However, by contrast, the effects of climate change and the actions to mitigate it 
also pose risks for financial institutions. In the case of banks, both physical risks (those arising 
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF AND CAPACITY TO ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN EUROPE
Chart 1
SOURCE: ESPON Climate (2011).
a Weighted combination of physical (weight 0.19), environmental (0.31), social (0.16), economic (0.24) and cultural (0.1) potential impacts of climate 
change. Weights are based on a Delphi survey of the ESPON Monitoring Committee. Impact calculated as combination of regional explosure to 
climatic changes and recent data on regional sensitivity. Climatic changes derived from comparison of 1961-1990 and 2017-2100 climate projections 
from the CCLM model for the IPCC SRES A1B scenario.
b Overall adaptive capacity towards climate change classified by quintiles. The overall adaptive capacity was calculated as weighted combination of 
economic capacity (weight 0.21), infrastructural capacity (0.16), technological capacity (0.23), khowledge and awareness (0.23) and institutional 
capacity (0.17). Weights are based on a Delphi survey of the  ESPON Monitoring Committee.
1  AGGREGATE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (a) 2  CAPACITY TO ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE (b)
HIGHEST NEGATIVE IMPACT (0.5 - 1.0)
MEDIUM NEGATIVE IMPACT (0.3 - <O.5)
LOW NEGATIVE IMPACT (0.1 - <O.3)
NO/MARGINAL IMPACT (>-0.1 - <O.1)
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from an increase in the frequency and severity of climate events) and transition risks (those 
linked to the transition to a low-carbon economy as a response to climate change) may 
take the form of credit, market and operational risks, as pointed out by the Bank of England 
(2018). This means that banks have to consider the risks associated with climate change 
and the transition to a low-carbon economy in their integrated risk management.
At the same time, central banks and supervisors are incorporating the analysis of 
climate change and the assessment of its risks into their work programmes. The motivation 
is multiple, due to the need to integrate these tasks into their micro-prudential supervisory 
practices and to monitor their potentially systemic nature insofar as they may affect the whole 
of the economy and the financial system. In addition, central banks are starting to consider 
ESG factors and Sustainable and Responsible Investment principles in the management of 
their own portfolios and planning to disclose climate related risks of their portfolios. As regards 
playing a more active role in promoting green finance, i.e. in the utilisation of monetary policy 
or macro-prudential policy instruments, central banks, particularly Western ones, are more 
cautious although some significant steps are starting to be taken by Bank of England and 
the Eurosystem. Institutional initiatives such as the creation of the Network for Greening the 
Financial System (NGFS) by central banks and supervisors, are contributing to an improved 
analysis allowing to incorporate environmental and climate-related issues in all these areas. 
Although the last few years have seen headway in green finance, in banks’ 
consideration of the opportunities and risks posed by climate change and the transition to a 
low-carbon economy and in the inclusion of these matters by central banks, the road ahead 
is still long. The obstacles and challenges to progress for investors, financial institutions and 
central banks are not insignificant. Notable among them are the lack of market information 
on exposures to climate change risks, the lack of common criteria for defining “green” and 
“carbon intensive or brown” assets,3 the lack of adequate methodologies for assessing the 
impact of climate change on the financial system, the fact that the time horizon of these risks 
is longer than the decision horizon of economic agents, etc. These obstacles, along with the 
lack of resolute and predictable policies, may explain the widespread observation that at 
present the value of assets is not being properly incorporated into climate and transition risks, 
and that financial resources are thus not being properly allocated. Against this background, 
international initiatives such as the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate Related 
Financial Disclosure (TCFD) on climate-related financial disclosures, and the work of the 
European Commission to develop a taxonomy and standards, are being of great help. 
The purpose of this article is to briefly review the current state of Green Finance 
and in particular the role being played by financial institutions and central banks. To do this, 
in order to place the institutional arena in its financial setting, we first look at institutional 
commitments relating to climate change and the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
3   So far, the term “brown” assets are usually used for those assets that harm the environment or don’t contribute to fight 
against climate change, for example assets related to those activities linked to coal or fossil fuels. Lately, there is some 
controversy over the use of the word “brown” but a common term has not yet been reached so in this article we will 
use “brown” with the meaning of “carbon-intensive”.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2126
Then, in section 3, we analyse the evolution of financial instruments designed to finance 
this transition, basically green bonds, and, in section 4, the risks posed by climate change 
to the financial system and particularly to banks. Section 5 looks at how central banks are 
considering climate matters in the performance of their functions and the tools they have at 
hand to address the risks posed by climate change to the financial system. The paper ends 
with some conclusions.
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2  Climate change and institutional commitment
The Paris Agreement, signed in 2015 by 195 countries within the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, has a clear aim set out in the form of specific goals: keep 
the global temperature rise this century well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, pursue 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C, increase the ability of countries to deal 
with the adverse effects of climate change, promote the development of low greenhouse gas 
emissions and foster the financing of investment to support sustainable growth. Every five 
years the countries have to communicate and maintain their national emission-reduction 
targets and, in addition, they have to set in train national policies and measures to achieve 
those targets. Furthermore, the implementation of the Paris agreement is essential to 
achieve the Sustainable Development Goals also agreed in 2015 in the United Nations 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.4
Since then, various institutional initiatives relating to the involvement of the 
financial system at the global and European levels have been launched.5 In the G20 ambit, 
the “G20 Green Finance Study Group” created in 2016 provided a starting point for 
sharing experiences at international level and for the main countries to become involved 
in developing measures to heighten the financial system’s sensitivity to climate change 
risk and interiorise it in its decision-making. This work continued in the “G20 Sustainable 
Finance Study Group” in 2018, where measures were proposed to increase the involvement 
of institutional investors in the financing of sustainable projects, sustainable initiatives in the 
venture capital area, and analysis of the new technologies applied in sustainable finance. In 
2021, the Italian Presidency of G-20 set the digital and green economic recovery as priorities 
of the work and the Sustainable Finance Study Group was reactivated with the objective to 
develop a multi-year roadmap.
At the European level, the European Commission presented the European Green 
Deal at the end of 2019 with the aim of making Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 
2050. It comprises several regulatory initiatives in order to achieve this goal. It comprises, 
among others, the development of a European Climate Law,6 the adoption of a European 
Industrial Strategy, an Action Plan for the Circular Economy, an European Union Biodiversity 
Strategy for 2030, and, all of this, jointly to achieve a fair transition and the need to mobilize 
resources to finance it.7 In this process, the financial sector has a key role. In September 
2020, Ursula von den Leyen, in her State of the Union speech, proposed the reduction 
target to be set at 55%, alongside a revision of the EU’s climate and energy legislation 
by June 2021, a target of spending 37% of the €750 billion NextGenerationEU recovery 
fund on Green Deal objectives, and the intention to raise 30% of the NextGenerationEU 
4   The 2030 Agenda defines 17 Sustainable Development Goals with 169 associated targets encompassing the economic, 
social and environmental areas in a 15-year strategy. Among the goals there is one devoted to “Climate Action”.
5  See González (2021a) for more detailed overview of the current institutional initiatives in sustainable finance.
6  The European Parliament approved the European Climate Law in June 2021.
7   See Communication (COM(2019)640) and more information in: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/
european-green-deal_es.
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budget through green bonds. In July 2021, the European Commission adopted a package of 
proposals to make the EU’s climate, energy, land use, transport and taxation policies fit for 
reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels, 
raising the goal stablished in the European Green Deal of 40% emissions reduction target.
One important element of the European Green Deal designed by the European 
Commission (EC) is the Renewed Strategy in Sustainable Finance, launched on 6 July that 
will be based on the so-called “Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth” on which 
the EC has been working since 2018. It will contribute to the link between finance and the 
European Union’s sustainable development agenda. Specifically, the Action Plan on Financing 
Sustainable Growth presented by EC in 2018 seeks to develop the European Union’s strategy 
on sustainable finance and to integrate environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters 
into the European financial system.8 Through this Action Plan (European Commission, 2018), 
the EC strengthens its commitment to EU sustainability goals, linked to the Agenda 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement climate change goals. 
The main goals of the EC’s Action Plan are: i) reorient capital flows towards 
sustainable investment, ii) manage financial risks stemming from climate change, 
environmental degradation and social issues, and iii) foster transparency and long-termism 
in financial and economic activity. To achieve these goals, the EC has worked on ten specific 
actions, as are shown in Figure 1. 
In 2018 the European Commission created a Technical Expert Group on Sustainable 
Finance (TEG) to provide support in four actions of the Action Plan: i) a classification to 
determine whether an economic activity is environmentally sustainable (known as 
taxonomy), ii) methodologies for developing EU climate benchmarks and iii) guidance to 
improve corporate disclosure of climate-related information, iv) an EU Green Bond Standard. 
The TEG published its work on these four topics between 2018 and 2020 and they have 
been the input for the work of the EC. Specifically, the EC has drawn up several regulations 
and texts about the first three issues. The taxonomy regulation is the first action of the 
Action Plan and constitutes a classification system of environmentally sustainable economic 
activities. It was approved in June 2020, entering into force in July 2020. The Taxonomy 
Regulation establishes the criteria for determining whether an economic activity qualifies as 
environmentally sustainable, that is mainly when it contributes substantially to one or more 
of the environmental objectives set by the regulation, it does not significantly harm any of the 
environmental objectives, it is carried out in compliance with the minimum safeguards and 
it complies with technical screening criteria that have been established by the Commission. 
Specifically, the six environmental objectives set are: i) climate change mitigation, ii) climate 
change adaptation, ii) the sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, 
iv) the transition to a circular economy, v) pollution prevention and control, vi) the protection 
8   The Action Plan defines “sustainable finance” as the process of taking due account of environmental and social 
considerations in investment decision-making, leading to increased investments in longer-term and sustainable 
activities. More specifically, environmental considerations refer to climate change mitigation and adaptation, as well as 
the environment in a broader sense and related risks (e.g. natural disasters).
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and restoration of biodiversity and ecosystems.9 The European Commission is working on 
the development of the technical criteria for each of the six environmental objectives.
With the aim to increase the transparency and disclosure, the EC developed, based 
on the work of the TEG, a specific regulation with the minimum standards for the elaboration 
of EU climate transition benchmarks and EU Paris-aligned benchmarks10 and new guidelines 
for companies on how to report climate-related information. The latter consist of a supplement 
to the existing guidelines on non-financial reporting and integrate the recommendations of 
the Financial Stability Board’s taskforce on climate-related financial disclosures (TCFD).11 In 
addition, the regulation on sustainability related disclosures in the financial sector services 
became effective in March 2021 and imposes sustainability-related disclosure requirements 
of financial market participants and financial advisers.12 And in April 2021, the EC adopted 
 9  See European Commission (2020).
10  See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1818 of 17 July 2020 supplementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards minimum standards for EU Climate Transition Benchmarks 
and EU Paris-aligned Benchmarks.
11  See Communication from the Commission Guidelines on non-financial reporting: Supplement on reporting climate-
related information (2019/C 209/01).
12  Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on sustainability-related 
disclosures in the financial services sector.
SOURCE: European Commission (2018).
GOALS AND ACTIONS OF THE EC’S ACTION PLAN ON FINANCING SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
Figure 1
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a proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), which would amend 
the existing reporting requirements of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD). The 
proposal extends the scope to all large companies and all companies listed on regulated 
markets (except listed micro-enterprises), requires the audit of reported information, 
introduces more detailed reporting requirements, and a requirement to report according to 
mandatory EU sustainability reporting standards.13 Moreover, the EC adopted a delegated 
act under the Taxonomy Regulation in July 2021 specifying the information to be disclosed 
by financial and non-financial undertakings concerning their environmental performance 
based on the EU Taxonomy and will apply from January 2022.
Regarding the development of a European green bond standard, the EC published 
a legislative proposal in July 2021. This standard will be voluntary and the main key 
requirements of this proposed framework are: taxonomy alignment, transparency, external 
review and supervision by the European Securities Market Authority (ESMA) reviewer.14 
The role of the TEG continues through the Platform on Sustainable Finance created 
by EC in December 2020 composed of experts from the private and public sector that will 
advise the EC on the technical screening criteria of the six environmental objectives of the 
taxonomy, as well as, the possible development of the taxonomy to other activities that 
significantly harm the environment or the development of a social taxonomy.15 In addition, 
the Platform will monitor and report on capital flows towards sustainable investments and 
will advise the Commission on sustainable finance policy more broadly.
Building on the work done in the last years under the Action Plan on Sustainable 
Finance, and in the framework of the European Green Deal, the EC is developing a Renewed 
Sustainable Finance Strategy with the aim of creating an enabling framework for private 
investors and the public sector to facilitate sustainable investments. In July 2021 the EC 
presented the “Strategy for Financing the Transition to a Sustainable Economy”16 that 
identifies four main areas where the actions are needed to focus and six specific actions 
as can be seen in Table 1. This strategy also complements other European Green Deal 
initiatives and the Fit for 55 Package presented in 2021 to make the EU’s climate, energy, 
land use, transport and taxation policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at 
least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels. 
In terms of financing, the Commission presented in January 2020 the European green 
deal investment plan as part of the Green Deal, which will mobilise at least 1 trillion euros 
13  Expected to apply from 2023. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, as regards 
corporate sustainability reporting.
14  See Press release “Commission puts forward new strategy to make the EU’s financial system more sustainable and 
proposes new European Green Bond Standard” https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3405.
15  The Platform published two draft reports on social taxonomy and on an extended taxonomy to support economic 
transition in July 2021. The Platform will collect the stakeholder feedback on both drafts in order to submit final reports 
with their advice to the Commission in autumn 2021.
16  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social 
Committee and The Committee of the Regions Empty Strategy for Financing the Transition to a Sustainable Economy.
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OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS OF THE RENEWED SUSTAINABLE FINANCE STRATEGY
Table 1
SOURCE: European Commission (2021).
I  Financing the transition of the real economy towards sustainability
    Action 1: To develop a more comprehensive 
    framework and help the financing 
    of intermediary steps towards sustainability
The Commission will: 
a  Consider proposing legislation to support the financing of certain economic activities, 
    mainly in the energy sector, that help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
b  Consider options for extending the EU Taxonomy framework to possibly recognise 
    economic activities performing at an intermediate level
c  Adopt a Complementary EU Taxonomy Climate Delegated Act covering new sectors
    including agriculture and certain energy activities 
d  Adopt a delegated act under the EU Taxonomy covering the remaining four environmental
    goals, i.e. water, biodiversity, pollution prevention and circular economy by Q2-2022 
e  Consider a general framework for labels for financial instruments, work on other bond
    labels such as transition or sustainability-link bonds, an ESG Benchmark label, minimum
    sustainability criteria for financial products that promote environmental or social
    characteristics and introduce targeted prospectus disclosures
II  Towards a more inclusive sustainable finance framework
    Action 2: To improve the inclusiveness 
    of sustainable finance
The Commission will: 
a  Ask the EBA for an opinion on the definition of and support for green loans and 
    mortgages, explore options to facilitate their uptake by 2022, and increase access of 
    citizens and SMEs to sustainable finance advisory services
b  Integrate sustainable finance related data in the data spaces under the European Data
    Strategy and reflect, together with the Digital Finance Platform, on possible further actions
    to enable and encourage innovative solutions using digital technologies to support SMEs
    and retail investors 
c  Identify insurance protection gaps through EIOPA’s natural disaster dashboard 
    and initiate a Climate Resilience Dialogue with all relevant stakeholders (2022) 
d  Publish a report on a social taxonomy by the end of 2021
e  Strengthen tracking methodologies for climate and biodiversity spending, support 
    Member States who want to redirect their national budget to green priorities and organise
    an inaugural annual Sustainable Investment Summit ahead of COP 26
III  Improving the financial sector’s resilience and contribution to sustainability: the double materiality perspective
    Action 3: To enhance economic and financial 
    resilience to sustainability risks
The Commission will: 
a  Work with EFRAG, ESMA and the IASB on how financial reporting standards can best 
    capture relevant sustainability risks
b  Take action to ensure that relevant ESG risks are systematically captured in credit ratings 
    and rating outlooks in a transparent manner, taking into account further assessment 
    by ESMA (2023) 
c  Propose amendments in the Capital Requirements Regulation and Capital Requirements 
    Directive to ensure the consistent integration of sustainability risks in risk management 
    systems of banks, including climate change stress tests by banks (2021) 
d  Propose amendments in the Solvency II Directive to consistently integrate sustainability 
    risks in risk management of insurers, including climate change scenario analysis by 
    insurers (2021) 
e  Strengthen long-term financial stability through closer cooperation on financial stability
    risk assessment, regular stress tests, an assessment of macro-prudential tools and a 
    study dedicated to risks stemming from environmental degradation and biodiversity loss
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of sustainable investments over the next decade. Reaching the 2030 climate and energy 
targets would require additional investments of approximately €260 billion a year by 2030.17 
Moreover, in a context of recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, the EU adapted its long-term 
budget to prioritise actions for the recovery and resilience that includes to support a green 
and digital transition. Next Generation EU (NGEU) is the temporary programme with which 
17  The figure of investment is referred to the objective of a 40% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels in 
set in the European Green Deal (presented in December 2019), however this goal has been updated in the “Fit for 55” 
increasing the reduction up to a 55% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030.
OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS OF THE RENEWED SUSTAINABLE FINANCE STRATEGY (cont'd)
Table 1
SOURCE: European Commission (2021).
III  Improving the financial sector’s resilience and contribution to sustainability: the double materiality perspective
    Action 4: To increase the contribution 
    of the financial sector to sustainability
The Commission will: 
a  Improve financial institutions’ disclosures of sustainability targets and transition planning, 
    examine to what extent more guidance could ensure that voluntary pledges are credible 
    and monitor progress
b  Ask EIOPA to assess the need to review the fiduciary duties of pension funds and 
    investors to reflect sustainability impacts as part of investment decision making 
    processes, including stewardship and engagement activities by 2022 
c  Take action to improve the reliability and comparability of ESG ratings and further assess
    certain aspects of ESG research, to decide on whether an intervention is necessary
    Action 5: To monitor an orderly transition 
    and ensure the integrity of the EU financial 
    system
The Commission will: 
a  Monitor greenwashing risks, and assess and review the current supervisory and 
    enforcement toolkit available to Competent Authorities, to ensure that supervisory
    powers, capabilities and obligations are fit for purpose, with the support of the 
    European Supervisory Authorities
b  Develop a robust monitoring framework to measure capital flows and assist Member 
    States in assessing the investment gap and measuring the progress made by their 
    financial sectors by 2023 
c  Strengthen cooperation among all relevant public authorities, including Member States,
    the ECB, the ESRB, the European Supervisory Authorities and the European Environment 
    Agency, to work towards a common approach to monitor an orderly transition and 
    ensure the double materiality perspective is consistently integrated across the EU financial 
    system (by 2022)
d  Establish a Sustainable Finance Research Forum to foster knowledge exchange between 
    researchers and the financial community
IV  Fostering global ambition
    Action 6: To set a high level of ambition 
    in developing international sustainable 
    finance initiatives and standards and to
    support EU partner countries. 
The Commission will: 
a  Seek an ambitious consensus in international forums, mainstream the concept of double
    materiality, stress the importance of disclosure frameworks, and agree on objectives 
    and principles for taxonomies
b  Propose to expand the work of the IPSF to new topics and strengthen its governance
c  Support low- and middle-income countries in scaling up their access to sustainable 
    finance by developing a comprehensive strategy and by promoting sustainability-related
    financial instruments.
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the EC will borrow €750 billion on the financial markets, of which the 30% will be through the 
issuance of green bonds. The funds of the NGEU will be channelled through EU programmes 
and the 37% of the NGEU will be spent directly on the EU Green Deal objectives.18
In Spain, the Ministry for Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge 
presented in 2019 the Strategic Energy and Climate Framework to facilitate the transformation 
of the economy based on three pillars: the Plan Nacional Integrado de Energía y Clima 
(Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan – PNIEC by its Spanish abbreviation) 2021-2030, 
the Climate Change and Energy Transition Act19, and the Estrategia de Transición Justa20 (Fair 
Transition Strategy) with the ultimate long-term goal to transform Spain into a carbon-neutral 
country by 2050 (see Miteco (2020)). The Ministry estimates that in the coming decade this 
framework will mobilise around €241,000 million of private and public investment in Spain 
between 2021 and 2030. 
As regards the financial sector, the Climate Change and Energy Transition Act, passed 
in May 2021, its article 32 is devoted to the financial sector stipulating that companies 
issuing securities, credit institutions, insurance companies and firms above a certain size will 
have to provide a higher level of detail about the financial impact of their risks associated 
with climate change through an annual report. In the case of credit institutions, they will 
have to publish specific decarbonization targets for their lending and investment portfolio 
aligned with the Paris Agreement as of 2023. The law includes the main areas that will 
have to be disclosed, about governance, strategy, real and potential impact of the risks 
and opportunities linked to climate change, risk management and assessment but the 
specific details will be legally developed in the next two years. Furthermore, in article 33 
it is specified that the Banco de España, the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 
(Spanish National Securities Market Commission) and the Dirección General de Seguros y 
Fondos de Pensiones (Directorate General of Insurance and Pension Funds) have to prepare 
a joint report with the assessment of the climate change risks to the financial system and the 
proposal of policies for combating them.
As can be seen, there is currently a resolute institutional commitment to contribute 
to reducing the impact of climate change and to move towards a low-carbon economy. 
Achieving it will call for the mobilization of resources and the financial sector is indispensable 
for doing this.
18  See Ursula von der Leyen, Speech State of the Union Address, 16 September 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1657. 
19  The Climate Change and Energy Transition Act was approved in May 2021 and constitutes the legislative framework 
for consolidating the strategy in diverse sectors and thus fostering the energy transition.
20  The Fair Transition Strategy aims to facilitate the transition in those sectors and geographical areas which may be most 
strongly affected by the transition to a more sustainable economic model.
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3 Financing the transition to a low-carbon economy
Achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and, in general, completing the measures designed 
to mitigate the effects of climate change will require far-reaching structural economic changes 
affecting practically all economic sectors and activities, particularly energy, extractive industries, 
transport, water treatment, waste treatment, infrastructure and residential construction. These 
economic changes will naturally entail considerable mobilisation of financial resources from 
some sectors to others and substantial additional investment. Hence the involvement of the 
financial system in achieving a decarbonised economy is absolutely necessary. 
There are various estimates on the funds needed to achieve the goal of keeping 
temperatures less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Thus, the International Energy Agency 
estimates that the current average of $2 trillion per year of global energy investment will have 
to raise to almost $5 trillion (4.5% of GDP) by 2030 and to $4.5 trillion (2.5% of GDP) by 2050, 
in order to achieve net-zero CO2 emissions in 2050.
21 IRENA (International Renewable Energy 
Agency) calculates that, on average, an investment of $4.4 trillion would be needed annually 
over the period 2021-2050 (more than double the level of investment in 2019 of $2.1 trillion), to 
limit global warming to 1.5°C22 and Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) estimates average 
investment requirements to be between $3.1 trillion and $5.8 trillion per year until 2050.23 These 
estimates are made under different scenarios, methodologies and sector coverages, but, the 
available estimates make it clear that an average amount of above $4 trillion must be invested 
every year in the coming decades to achieve a low-carbon economy. For the European Union, 
the European Commission estimates that to achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction of 
55%24 by 2030 would require €350 billion of additional investment per year with respect the 
average annual investment of the last decade.25
The transition to a low-carbon economy requires resolute action by the public 
sector in policies, investments and resources, but the financing of these investments also 
unquestionably requires the action of the private sector and the involvement of financial 
institutions in channelling funds from savers to fund-seekers through multiple financing 
instruments. To date the progress, as will be seen below, is substantial but still insufficient, 
with green bonds being the most commonly used financing instrument.
3.1 Green bonds
A green bond is a bond in which the funds are used to finance projects directly relating to 
sustainability, the preservation of natural environments and the transition to a low-carbon 
21  By sector, much of this investment will go to transport, electricity generation and infrastructure. Figures are using 2019 
prices. See IEA (2021) and Lenaerts et al. (2021).
22  See IRENA (2021) and Lenaerts et al. (2021).
23  See Lenaerts et al. (2021).
24  The target of 40% greenhouse gas reduction by 2030 has been updated under the new package “Fit 55” presented 
by the European Commission in July 2021. The new objective is to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 
55% by 2030.
25  See European Commission (2021) and Lenaerts et al. (2021).
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economy. To receive certification as a green bond, a bond has to meet certain principles 
(e.g. the Green Bond Principles or GBP),26 under which the issuer has to identify in detail the 
activity to be financed and allocate it to an eligible category,27 quantify the impact, inform 
about the management of the proceeds, the process for project evaluation and selection and 
regularly report about the status of the project. Generally, in order to avoid “greenwashing” 
i.e. fraudulent declaration as green, an external assessor28 certifies that the principles 
declared by the issuer are being faithfully observed. Additionally, the bond can be certified 
by a certifier such Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI). 
Chart 2, which describes the development of green bond issuance, shows that 
the issuance of these instruments has grown considerably from 2014, when the GBP were 
published, with a cumulative issuance up to September 2021 over $1.4 trillion and an 
outstanding nominal over $1.2 trillion.29 The COVID-19 outbreak had a substantial impact in 
most financial markets, and the green bond segment was not an exception. Thus, in the first 
half of 2020 green bond issuance dropped by 22% with respect to H1 2019, being the fall 
26  The Green Bond Principles were drawn up by ICMA in 2014 and are generally updated once a year to include the latest 
market developments (see ICMA (2018)). Other principles or standards are those established by the Climate Bond 
Initiative or CBI (see CBI (2019)). Some jurisdictions, such as China, have set their own standards. The rating agencies 
have also prepared criteria to assess the “greenness” of issues targeted at potentially green projects (and to take 
account of matters relating to climate change in their ratings of financial institutions and non-financial corporations). 
As it has been mentioned in section 2, the EC is working on a proposal of a European green bond standard (EUGBS).
27  For example: renewable energy, energy efficiency, reduction of polluting emissions, sustainable mobility, conservation 
of biodiversity, recycling technology and construction of sustainable buildings.
28  For example, Cicero, Sustainalytics, Vigeo Eiris and others. Currently more than 80% of green bonds have an external 
assessor. See Alonso and Marqués (2019) for a panorama of new sustainable financial service providers.
29  Figures for green bonds in this section are obtained from CBI database and may not exactly match other sources. CBI 
includes bonds in its database only if they meet certain criteria, such as that at least 95% of the proceeds go to finance 
green projects that meet CBI taxonomy. Figures for September 2021 are provisional.
GREEN BOND ISSUANCE AND OUTSTANDING VOLUMES (2007-2021) (a)
Chart 2
SOURCE: CBI (since 2014) & Dealogic.
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general across types of issuers and regions, with the exception of LatAm driven by the Chilean 
Treasury issuance. In contrast, issuance of sustainability and social bonds more than doubled 
in H12020 with respect H12019, and total issuance in 2020 increased from $64 billion in 2019 
to $235 billion,30 with a large portion of the proceeds used to finance COVID-19 response 
measures.31 Green bond primary market activity recovered during the second half of 2020, 
and issuance for the whole year reached $290 billion, an 8% higher than 2019 issuance. In 
this recovery of the green market, the statements made by governments and regulators on 
giving a green and sustainable orientation to measures supporting stabilisation and recovery 
of the economy played, certainly, a role. Against this background, sustainable bonds issuance 
has been even more dynamic during the first half of 2021, with an issuance of $245 billion in 
green bonds, $139 billion in social bonds, $89 billion in sustainability bonds and $43 billion of 
Sustainable linked bonds (SLB).32 
The first green bond issue was issued by the European Investment Bank in 2007 
for an amount of €600 million. In subsequent years, green bond issuance was dominated by 
international financial institutions (the EIB itself, the World Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation, the IMF and development banks). From 2014, coinciding with the publication 
of the ICMA Green Bond principles (GBP), an increasingly active role has been played by 
banks, large firms, municipal corporations, government agencies and treasuries. As Chart 3 
describes, non-financial corporates are the largest issuers, with a cumulative issuance 
since 2013 to H1 2021 of $323 billon, being the main issuers energy, transport and real 
state corporations. Non-financial corporates are followed first by financial institutions with a 
cumulative issuance of $266, mainly banks, second by government-back entities, with $199 
billion, and third by development banks (including supranational entities) with $172. 
The first treasury to issue green bonds was that of Poland in December 2016 with an issue 
of €750 million, closely followed by the French treasury, which issued €2 billion in January 2017. 
Since then, and up to 2020, other fifteen treasuries such as those of Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Lithuania, Ireland, Indonesia and the Netherlands have made green issuances totalling 
approximately $86 billion up to December 2020 (see Chart 4). Sovereign issuance is increasing 
significantly in 2021, with an issuance up to September of $57 billion and , Italy, Spain, Serbia and 
United Kingdom entering the green bond market.33 The EU have announced that it will start a €250 
billion green bond program over the next five years in October 2021.
30  See IFF (2021). These figures include Sustainability bonds, Social bonds and Sustainability-linked bonds. A Sustainability 
Bond is defined as a bond which proceeds are applied to environmentally sustainable outcome, a combination of both 
green and social projects. For Social bonds the proceeds are applied towards social projects, like promoting social 
welfare (health, education, support of SMEs, etc.) and creating a positive impact within communities. A Sustainability-
Linked Bonds (“SLBs”) is any type of bond for which the financial and/or structural characteristics can vary depending 
on whether the issuer achieves predefined Sustainability/ ESG objective.
31  See CBI (2020). 
32  Issuance of green bonds in Q3 2021 continuous to be very dynamic, particularly in September. From July to mid-
September, green bond issuance has exceeded $107 billion. 
33  Italy issued a €8.5 billion inaugural green bond in March 3, 2021 with a maturity of 24 years and an order book of €80 
billion. Spain launched its inaugural green bond in September 7, 2021, with a volume of €5 billion a maturity of 20 
years and an oversubscription multiplied by 12. Serbia issued its first soveriegn green bond in September 17, 2021 
raising €1 billion. UK has issued its first green bond in September 21, 2021 with a volume of £10 billion and an order 
book of over £90 billion.
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The issuances shown in Charts 2, 3, and 4 include a wide range of bond types 
such as straight bonds, subordinated bonds, covered bonds, Islamic bonds, asset-backed 
securities. Among these instruments, straight bonds are the most common, accounting for 
more than 40% of green bond issuance, followed by asset-backed securities (11.4% of 
cumulative issuance) and, with some distance, covered bonds. Notable regarding the issuance 
ISSUANCE BY TYPE OF ISSUER AND YEAR
Chart 3
SOURCES: CBI & DEALOGIC.
a Up to H1 2021.
b Includes Supranationals.
c Asset backed securities.
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SOURCE: CBI.
a Egypt, Hungary, Lithuania, Nigeria, Fiji, Ghana and Seychelles, all of them with an issuance below $1bn, are omittted in the graph.
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of green asset-backed securities (ABS) is the role played by the US government-sponsored 
agency Fannie Mae, issuing securitises backed by mortgages meeting certain energy efficiency 
conditions for the purpose of refinancing them. Since 2013, and up to June 2021, this agency has 
issued $96 billion of green asset-backed securities, 7.4% of total cumulative issuance, leading 
the ranking of individual issuers (see Chart 5), although in 2020 its issuance dropped substantially, 
a 43%, mostly during the first half of the year as a consequence of Covid 19 pandemic effect. 
The second largest issuer is the German development bank KFW, followed very closely by French 
Treasury and EIB. All together, these ten top issuers represent 26% of total accumulative issuance, 
among them there are two French issuers, two German, two Supranational, one from Spain, one 
from Netherlands and one Chinese. Only two of them are private corporations, coming from the 
energy sector: Iberdrola (Spanish) and Tennet Holdings (Dutch). 
Issuance by currency shows the predominant and increasing role played by Euro 
(see Chart 6), with a 38% share for the period 2014-2019 and of 48% for period 2020-
H1 2021. Euro is followed by USD, with a share of 37% for 2014-2019 that have decreased to 
28% for 2020-H1 2021. USD is followed, at a long distance, by CNY, with an 10% of share in 
2014-2019 and of 7% in 2020-H1 2021. The fall in USD share was partly due to lower Fannie 
Mae issuance in 2020, whereas the decline in CNY is explained by the general weaker 
activity of Chinese issuers during 2020.
Regional analysis shows that most issuances are in Europe (see Chart 6), with 
46% of them in the period 2014-H1 2021 and an increasing trend in the share (53% in 
2020-H1 2021). Next comes North America, with 23% (and a decreasing trend), followed 
closely by the Asia-Pacific region with 22.5%. Issuances by Supranational institutions for 
the aforementioned period amount to $85 billion, representing 7% of total issues. 
By country, the main issuer is the USA (with $261 billion since 2014 and up to 
H1 2021), with ABS (promoted by Fannie Mae) and Local Governments being the main type of 
TOP TEN ISSUERS (2013-H1 2021)
Chart 5
SOURCE: CBI.
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issuers, having a combined share of around 70%. The USA is followed by China ($152 billion), 
France with $148 billion and Germany with $122 billion. Spain ranks eighth with issuance of 
$47 billion (see Chart 7) and fifth country in Europe. 2020-H1 2021 ranking shows some 
changes, with Germany, that increased its issuance significantly, ranking second, France 
third, China falling to the fourth position and Supranational entities to eight. Spain ranks 
seventh in this period and fifth in 2021. 
The first Spanish green bond issuer was Iberdrola in 2014 with a €750 million green 
bond. From 2014 to September 2021, a total of $50 billion was issued, the main issuer being 
Iberdrola, with $15 billion (see Chart 8). To date, Spanish issuers have been mainly non-
financial corporations, with a share of 52%, followed, by financial institutions (27%), Spanish 
Treasury (11.8%) and Government-backed entities (Adif and ICO) with a share of 9% From 
January to September 2021, Spanish issuers have issued a total of $16.8 billion, including 
the first Spanish sovereign bond issued in September 2021 with a nominal value of €5 billion 
($5.9 billion).
Stock Exchanges have played, and will continue to play, an important role in 
scaling up the green bond market by facilitating liquidity, transparency and market integrity. 
The first stock exchange to create a dedicated green bond segment was the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. Today, there are 22 exchanges with green bond sections, being the most 
popular the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, followed by Euronext Paris, Luxembourg Green 
Exchange and Frankfurt. Also, since 2014, several green bond Indices have been launched 
such as Solactive Bond Green Index (the first one launched), MSCI Barclays Green Bond 
Index, BAML Green Bond Index, S&P Green Bond Index and China Bond China Green 
Bond Index. Green bond indices make it easier for investors to track the performance of 
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green bonds, and compare returns and volatility with other investments although currently 
there are multiple indices with different approaches.
Other interesting topic is the purpose of the project behind the green bond issuance. 
Chart 9 exhibits the use of proceeds from green bond issuance for the period 2014-2020, 
classified in nine broad sectors used in CBI Taxonomy.34 Energy sector projects get the 
highest green funding, although throughout the observed period it has been losing share 
34  See CBI (2021).
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in favour of low carbon buildings and low carbon transport (which includes infrastructure). In 
2020, Energy and Transport green funding through green bonds have been resilient while low 
carbon buildings have experienced a slight drop.
3.2 Green bond premium?
As the green bond market has matured, academics and analysts have studied whether 
green bonds trade at a higher price than comparable conventional bonds (see Table 2), that 
is whether investors are willing to receive a somewhat lower yield, a green bond premium 
(or greenium) to invest in a green bond, suggesting a high demand for these bonds by 
investors with environmental and sustainability preferences.
Regarding issuance, Ehlers and Packer (2017) compare the issue price of 21 
straight green bonds issued from 2014-2017 with that of conventional bonds from the same 
issuers, in order to monitor the credit risk. They conclude that, on average, green bonds 
are issued with yield around 18 basis points lower than that of comparable conventional 
bonds, although five of the 21 green bonds examined showed no advantage. The study also 
reports that this green bond premium (GBP) on green bonds is higher for lower-rated issuers. 
Fatica et al. (2019) also find evidence for a green bond premium when the issuer is an 
international financial institution (IFI) or non-financial corporation and the green bond is 
certified. However, if the issuer is a financial institution and not certified, the green bond 
premium disappears. These results indicate that the issuer’s environmental reputation and 
the certainty that the financing is actually for a green project are important when it comes 
to explaining the existence of a green bond premium. Gianfrate and Peri (2019) obtains 
statistically significant average greenium of around 18 basis points at issuance, being larger 
USE OF PROCEEDS (2014-2020)
Chart 9
SOURCES: ICB.
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for corporate issuers. It persists in the secondary market. Baker et al. (2018) analyse the 
green bond premium in the issuance of US municipal green bonds for the period 2016-
2017, and find a GBP of around six basis points on average and notably higher for certified 
green bonds. They also find that the holders of these green bonds are highly concentrated, 
particularly when the green bonds are certified, suggesting that the demand comes from 
very specific investors that hold the bonds to maturity.
SELECTED GREEN BOND PREMIUM LITERATURE
Table 2
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
?)PBG( muimerP dnoB neerGrepaP
Bachelet et al. (2019) GBP only if they are issued by institutional issuers (such as the World Bank) or have certification. (Data 2013-2017)
Baker et al. (2018) GBP of around 6 bps on average and notably higher for certified green bonds. (US municipal green bonds - period
2016-2017)
Barclays (2015) A greenium of 17 bps for the Global Green Bond Index with respect to the Global Credit Index
Ben Slimane et al. (2020) Statistically significant overall negative premium that is greater for certain types of green bonds. When controlling for 
liquidity, the greenium is even higher. (Green bonds included in an the MSCI Barclays Green Bond Index)
Ehlers and Parker (2017) Green bonds are issued with yield around 18 bps lower than comparable conventional bonds. GBP on green bonds is 
higher for lower-rated issuers. In the case of bond indexes, no significant difference in returns compared with 
conventional bonds (Data 2014-2017)
Fatica et al. (2019) GBP when the issuer is an international financial institution (IFI) or non-financial corporation and the green bond is 
certified. If the issuer is a financial institution and not certified, the green bond premium disappears
Gianfrate and Peri (2019) Statistically significant average GBP of around 18 bps at issuance. The premium is larger for corporate issuers (21 bps).
The premium persists in the secondary market (Data 2013-2017)
Gimeno and Sols (2020) In the case of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), There is no greenium at 
the start of the period analysed (2015-2016). Throughout 2017 (for KfW) and 2018 (for the EIB) the premiums began 
to be negative (in favour of green bonds versus conventional bonds) reaching 8 bps in 2019 H1. However, they 
diminished in 2019 H2
Hachenberg and Siereck 
(2018)
No appreciable GBP
Hyun et al. (2020) On average, there is no robust and significant GBP, however for green bonds certified by an external reviewer they 
find a significant greenium of about 6 bps and for those bonds with a CBI certificate the greenium is of around 15 bps
Kaiser et al. (2021) Signicant GBP of 8 bps, on average the GBP is driven by green bonds denominated in Euro, whereas USD 
denominated bonds yield a positive premium (9 bps). The Second Party Opinion (SPO) has no impact on the GBP 
when the issuer's environmental performance is high; whereas SPO has a signicant impact when the issuers
environmental performance is low
Kapraun and Scheins 
(2019)
Greenium at issuance of about 18 bps This GBP is high and significant for bonds issued by official entities such 
as governments or supranational, or for bonds denominated in major currencies USD or EUR. For corporate green 
bonds, however, additional certification of green credentials is required. For the secondary markets, the greenium 
increases significantly with the green credibility of the bond
Larker and Watts (2019) No appreciable GBP
Marqués and Romo (2018) Slight positive return for green bonds. (Green bond indices - Data 2017-2018)
Nanayakkara and 
Colombage (2019)
Green bonds are traded at a GBP of 63 bps, compared with a comparable corporate bond issue (Data 2016-2017)
Zerbib (2016) GBP of around 2 bps using a sample of 110 green bonds issued between 2013 and 2017. GBP higher for lower-
rated issuers
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In the secondary market, Zerbib (2016) estimates a green bond premium of around two 
basis points using a sample of 110 green bonds issued between 2013 and 2017, the GBP being 
higher for lower-rated issuers. Barclays (2015) estimates a greenium of around 17 basis points 
for the Global Green Bond Index with respect to the Global Credit Index. However, Hachenberg 
and Shiereck (2018) and Larcker and Watts (2019) did not find an appreciable green bond 
premium. Bachelet et al. (2019), using data on bonds between 2013 and 2017, conclude that 
green bonds are traded at a lower than those of conventional bonds only if they are issued by 
institutional issuers (such as the World Bank) or have certification. Gimeno and Sols (2020) find 
that in the case of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and KFW (German development bank), 
there is no greenium at the start of the period analysed (2015-2016). Throughout 2017 (for KfW) 
and 2018 (for the EIB) a GBP up to 8 bps is observed. Hyun et al. (2020) use secondary market 
data to compare green bonds with synthetic conventional bonds and after adjusting for liquidity 
they find that, on average, there is no robust and significant GBP. However, for green bonds 
certified by an external reviewer they find a significant greenium of about 6 bps and for those 
bonds with a CBI certificate, the greenium is of around 15 basis points. Kapraun and Scheins 
(2019) use a large data set of green and conventional bonds and find a greenium at issuance of 
about 18 basis points. This premium is high and significant for bonds issued by official entities 
such as governments or supranational, or for bonds denominated in major currencies USD 
or EUR. For corporate green bonds, however, additional certification of green credentials is 
required. For the secondary markets, they find that the greenium increases significantly with 
the green credibility of the bond, indicated e.g., by a listing on a green exchange, the overall 
environmental sentiment in the country of issue, as well as the sustainable reputation of the 
bond issuer. 
Ben et al. (2020) consider green bonds included in the MSCI Barclays Green Bond 
Index and use two methodologies, finding in both of them a statistically significant overall 
negative premium that is greater for certain types of green bonds. When controlling for liquidity, 
the greenium is even higher. Nanayakkara and Colombage (2019) obtains that green bonds 
are traded at a GBP of 63 basis points compared with a comparable corporate bond issue. 
Kaiser et al. (2021), following the methodology in Zerbib (2019), obtain that there is, on average, 
a significant GBP of 8 bps and that Second Party Opinion (SPO) has no impact on the GBP 
when the issuer’s environmental performance is high, while it has a significant impact on the 
greenium when the issuers environmental performance is low.
In the case of indices, Ehlers and Packer (2017) and Marqués and Romo (2018) 
use green bond indices and general bond indices to analyse the return on green bonds in 
comparison with ordinary bonds. Ehlers and Packer (2017) conclude that, for the period 
2014-2017, green bonds do not generally yield a higher hedged return than conventional 
bonds,35 while Marqués and Romo (2018) find for the period 2017-2018 a slight positive 
return for green bonds. However, the authors of both studies report that the results have to 
be interpreted with caution given the differing composition of green bond indices compared 
35  Both studies analyse the hedged returns, i.e. the proceeds in dollars that can be obtained by hedging the portfolio of 
the exchange rate risk index. 
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with those of conventional bonds as regards maturities, outstanding volume, liquidity and 
other non-green characteristics which may affect yield.
In short, although the results are mixed, the most recent evidence seems to favour 
the existence of a moderate green bond premium, in particularly if the green bond has a 
certification or the issuer has credibility and ESG reputation. However, the fact that investors 
are willing to receive a lower return than for an ordinary bond does not mean they are attributing 
lower risk to green assets, since the feature of green bonds used for the studies cited in the 
preceding paragraphs is the issuer (i.e. the bank or IFI, or the Treasury, etc. which issued 
the bond) and not the green project itself. The green bond premium seems to indicate 
an excess demand coming from investors willing to forego some income given their 
investment mandates that seek green level or explicitly account for climate risks (see 
Zerbib (2016)). Gimeno and Sols (2020) argue and explore the possibility that, in addition 
to risk and return factors, certain investors incorporate a sustainability factor in their 
investment decisions. This is consistent with the general mispricing of climate related 
risks explained in next sub-section.36
3.3 The broader world of sustainable finance 
Not all green finance comes from green bonds, but that from other instruments such as 
project finance, self-finance, wholesale/syndicated loans and retail loans (of which little is 
known) is of a smaller amount. Chart 10 displays the green loan market development since 
2013. The market experienced a significant growth since 2018, following the publication of 
the Green Loan Principles (GBPs) by the Loan Market Association, providing rules of play 
and guidance to the loan market. In spite of this significant growth, green bond market is still 
three times larger than green loan market. 
As in the case of green bonds, green loans are raised most actively in mature 
market, mainly European market, making up more than half of the total market, followed by 
Asia-Pacific market. The green loan activity is very insignificant in Africa and LatAm regions. 
Almost 85% of the funds raised by green loans goes to investments in just five sectors: 
renewable energy (47%), power generation (23%), utilities (8%) and buildings (6%).37
In addition to green bonds and green loans, other sustainable debt instruments 
such sustainability bonds, social bonds, sustainability linked bonds and sustainability linked 
loans are receiving an increasing attention by issuers and investors.38 Chart 11 shows the 
development of these markets since 2013. The issuance of these instruments have risen 
very significantly since 2017, and particularly in 2020, with an overall increase of 152% with 
respect to 2019, and a share of total sustainable debt over 40%, while in 2017 this share 
36  See ESRB (2020). 
37  See Nordea (2020).
38  For a definition of Social bond, Sustainability bond and Sustainability-linked bond, see footnote 30. A sustainability-linked 
loan (SLL) is defined as any type of loan instrument and/or contingent facility (eg bonding line, guarantee line, letter of 
credit) that incentivizes the borrower’s achievement of ambitious, predetermined sustainability performance objectives.
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was just close to 8%. A stronger political and social awareness towards the need of a more 
sustainable economic growth and the need to fight inequality are forces behind this growth. 
First half of 2021 shows that the activity of this market is expanding even more.
In 2020, the segment of sustainable debt with more impressive growth was social 
bonds. Issuance in these bonds went from $18 bn in 2019 to $148 bn in 2020, with the 
Covid-19 crisis being a clear catalyst for this growth and, in particular, the European Union’s 
temporary aid program to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, “SURE”, which 
GREEN LOANS (2013-H1 2021)
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saw €39.5 billion issued in the social bond format. In 2021, a further €50 billion have been 
issued under the program, totaling then €89.5 bn, very close to the total SURE fundrising 
planned (€94 bn). Overall market activity in the social bonds market segment has remained 
very active during the first half of 2021, with a total issuance of $139 billion, close to the 
2020 whole year figure. The majority of the issuers in this segment of the market come from 
supranational, sovereign, local or regional governments, and agencies sectors.
The market for sustainability-linked finance also experienced a rapid growth. In 2020, 
sustainability-linked bond issuance (SLB) almost doubled to $11bn, and up to June 2021 the 
issuance is over $40 billion. The publication of the Sustainability-linked Bond Principles in June 
2020 and the announcement in September of SLB bond’s eligibility for central bank collateral 
by the ECB starting in January 2021, have been two important drivers of this growth. An 
even more dynamic segment is the one of sustainability-linked loans (SLL), particularly 
since 2019, following the publication of the Sustainability-linked Loan Principles, with an 
activity in the first half of 2021 of $111 billion. The format of sustainability-linked loans 
allows for a broader application than green loans, not requiring a definition of green 
assets and projects to be financed but instead allows an entity to commit to sustainability 
targets that are linked to the terms of the debt. 
Finally, another bond segment that have emerged in the sustainable debt club are 
transition bonds. Transition bond are bonds that do not meet the criteria and market adopted 
standards for green bonds but which are associated with issuers who are transitioning to 
decarbonized business models and are particularly targeted at the high carbon-emitting 
sectors or industries such as mining, steel, chemicals, cement, aviation. The concept of a 
transition bond was developed by AXA Investment Managers in 2019. The market is still very 
incipient, $2.2 billion in H1 2021, but it has some potential of growing, in particular following the 
publication by ICMA in December 2020 of the Climate Transition Finance Handbook. With 
the aim of supporting the growth of climate transition finance, the handbook seeks to provide 
clear guidance and common expectations to capital markets participants on the practices, 
actions and disclosures to be made available when raising funds in debt markets for climate 
transition-related purposes.
3.4  The road ahead and the challenges to overcome: informational market failures 
and carbon pricing
Although the issuance of green instruments has progressed notably in recent years, it has 
still not reached the goal of $1 trillion per year and represents only a small part of total bond 
issuance (around 5%). The issuance of green instruments, and of green bonds in particular, has 
significant potential for growth, but to do so it has to overcome significant obstacles (see Box 2).
One of the factors hindering a further expansion of green financial markets, and therefore 
of green funding, is the observed mispricing of climate related risk. That is, climate risk does not 
seem to be fully reflected in current asset prices. In this vein, Monnin (2018a) consider that, if 
investors correctly reflected climate change risks in asset values, carbon-intensive assets should 
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have higher discount rates because they are exposed to higher risks, but this does not seem 
to be the case. Thus, as cited by Monnin (2018a), the Blackrock Investment Institute (2015) 
analyses how climate risks are reflected in the value of the shares of a wide range of sectors in 
the global market, and do not find any significant evidence that the securities of firms more 
exposed to climate change incorporate a higher risk premium. Also, if markets correctly 
reflected climate risks, it could also be expected that asset prices should react to news on 
climate risk, which also does not seem to be the case. For example, Batten et al. (2016) do 
not find any statistically significant evidence that the value of oil and gas company shares 
reacts to news relating to the transition to a low-carbon economy. Other studies finding evidence 
of incorrect valuations of climate change risks are Hong, Li and Xu (2017) and Kumar, Xing and 
Zhang (2018). 
Taking a somewhat more optimistic view is Pereira da Silva (2019), who cites a 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) research paper written by T. Ehlers, K. de Greiff and 
F. Packer in 2018, which examines whether climate change risks, particularly those relating 
to climate policy risks, are properly valued in the syndicated bank loan market and concludes 
that climate change risk premia have risen considerably since the Paris agreements, due to 
greater investor awareness of climate change. Along the same lines, some recent studies 
provide further evidence that investors may have started to incorporate climate change 
information when assessing risk profiles.39
Despite this progress, there is a broad perception that climate risks remain to be 
mispriced in financial markets. Krueger, Sautner and Starks (2019) report, on the basis of 
a survey of 439 institutional investors, that investors generally consider that assets are 
incorrectly valued in respect of climate change, although the valuation error is considered to 
be slight, particularly in the securities of oil companies and traditional and electric automobile 
manufacturers. Also, according to a survey of investors by BNY Mellon, ninety-three percent 
of institutional investors view climate change as an investment risk that has yet to be priced 
in by all the key financial markets globally.40
Empirical evidence suggests that there are two main factors behind this mispricing 
of climate risks by financial markets. First, informational market failures, and second, a 
failure by market participants to correctly price externalities and tail events that are beyond 
the historical distribution of outcomes.
Without appropriate information on the financial risks associated with climate 
change, it is not possible to properly factor climate change into asset valuations and avoid 
inefficient allocation of resources. In this line, Batten et al. (2016) consider that adequate 
public information should allow market participants to assess risks more accurately, avoid 
investing in firms which they consider are causing large negative externalities, and evaluate 
the risks associated with policies limiting the use of CO2 emissions. This not only would 
39  See, for example, Ilhan et al. (2018) and Bolton and Kacperczyk (2020).
40  See BNY Mellon (2020).
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contribute to a better pricing of climate risks but also would facilitate an orderly transition 
to a low-carbon economy and would be of help for formulating efficient climate policies 
and for a knowledge of their impact on the stability of the financial system. The absence of 
common, clear and transparent definitions as well as standardized disclosures requirements 
are the main factors behind the informational market failures. In this context, the European 
regulation on “green” taxonomy41 and that on benchmark indices (see section 2), will be of a 
great help for investors and issuers to distinguish what is “green”.
Regarding climate-related financial disclosures, in June 2017 the TCFD 
(Task Force on Climate Financial Disclosure), a group launched by the FSB and formed 
by representatives of the private sector, published its recommendations on voluntary, 
consistent, comparable, reliable and clear information on climate-related financial risks for 
companies to provide information to lenders, insurers, investors and other interested parties. 
These recommendations are structured around four thematic areas: governance, strategy, 
risk management, and metrics and targets (see Box 1). As of end of September 2021, TCFD 
recommendations are supported by over 2,300 companies and organizations.
TCFD recommendations are serving as a global base of climate-related financial 
disclosure. Thus, governments and financial regulators are including the recommendations 
in policy and guidance and are moving toward requiring TCFD based disclosures through 
legislation and regulation.42 Additionally, investor demand for companies to report 
information in line with the TCFD recommendations is also growing significantly43 and 
many large asset managers are requesting investee companies to report in line with the 
TCFD recommendations and reflected this in their investment practices or policies. At a 
more international level, the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation (IFRS) 
is working, with the support of FSB and IOSCO, on establishing internationally agreed 
consistent, high-quality and auditable standards for disclosures for climate-related financial 
risks based on the TCFD recommendations.
In its last Status Report (TCFD, 2020), the TCFD recognizes the progress made both 
in terms of the number of companies reporting and the quality of such reporting, with an 
increase of 6% between 2017 and 2019 of disclosure aligned with TCFD recommendations 
(see Box 1). However, a significant and faster progress is still needed since here are still 
significant gaps between the focus of current climate reporting by many companies and the 
41  Entered into force on 12 July 2020. Now the Commission will adopt delegated acts containing specific technical 
screening criteria to supplement the principles set out in the Regulation and determine which economic activities can 
qualify for each environmental objective.
42  For example, The European Commission incorporated the TCFD recommendations into its Guidelines on Reporting 
Climate-Related Information to support companies in disclosing climate-related information under the European 
Union’s reporting requirements (Directive 2014/95/EU), and the Financial Conduct Authority (UK) released a proposal 
for certain listed companies to state in their annual financial reports whether they made disclosures consistent with the 
TCFD recommendations.
43  For example, as part of Climate Action 100+ (an investor-led initiative to ensure the world’s largest corporate greenhouse 
gas emitters take necessary action on climate change), more than 500 investors with over $47 trillion in assets under 
management are engaging the world’s largest corporate greenhouse gas emitters to strengthen their climate-related 
disclosures by implementing the TCFD recommendations.
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information that must be synthesized to meet the TCFD recommendations. In particular, the TCFD 
considers that companies’ disclosure of the potential financial impact of climate change on 
their businesses and strategies remains low. In the same line ESRB (2020) considers that 
disclosures remain incomplete, inconsistent and insufficient.44 
One of the reasons for the slow progress in disclosures aligned with TCFD 
recommendations is that they are rather challenging, Aspects that are particularly challenging 
for companies are identifying and quantifying the potential financial impact of climate-related 
issues and stress testing the resiliency of their strategies under different climate scenarios. 
Against this background, organizations like the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, the Climate Disclosure Standards Board, the Institute for International 
Finance, the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP Fi) and the 
TCFD itself, are giving support and guidance on implementing the TCFD recommendations. 
Also regulatory bodies such as European Banking Authority, European Commission and 
European Central Bank among others, are publishing or working on guidelines.
However, even if climate related disclosures improve and informational market 
failures are lessened, mispricing of climate related risks and allocative inefficiencies may 
persist. Given the absence of a, ideally global, consistent carbon pricing scheme that 
adequately captures climate change externalities, such as an increase in carbon taxes, 
financial markets will continue to be unable to fully reflect climate related risks, and allocate 
capital sub-optimally.
Lastly, it should be mentioned that a good part of the transition to a low-carbon 
economy will have to come from micro, small and medium-sized firms, particularly in the 
emerging and less developed countries. However, the lack of access to green finance 
by these firms is currently one of the main barriers to progress in financing a sustainable 
economy, since the usual difficulty of credit assessment of these micro- and small firms 
is compounded by the additional task of assessing the profitability of new projects. To 
mitigate these obstacles, many development banks and international financial institutions 
are developing and launching green lending programmes for small and medium-sized 
enterprises financed by green bond issuance, but the road ahead is still long. 
44  ESRB (2020) explains that “Incompleteness relates to the voluntary nature of current disclosures, meaning that firm 
disclosures of climate metrics remain partial and incomplete amid likely selection bias, and therefore not representative 
of the broader industrial sample of polluting firms. Inconsistency relates to the potential for so-called “greenwashing”, 
with an inadequate accreditation for green labelled products absent a widely accepted benchmark taxonomy. 
Insufficiency relates mainly to the downstream emission intensity of the products of portfolios, which are rarely reported 
in a consistent manner.”
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4 Financial institutions and climate change: opportunities and risks
The transition to a low-carbon economy offers financial institutions clear business 
opportunities and, as a result, the green finance activities of banks are growing notably. As 
seen in the preceding section, financial institutions are actively issuing green bonds and 
syndicated loans45 and other wholesale loans. In addition, financial institutions are offering 
all kinds of green finance services, such as issuance underwriting, arrangement of special 
facilities, advisory services, valuation, etc. According to the Risk Assessment Questionnaire 
conducted by the EBA in Autumn 2020,46 more than 90% of the 60 respondent banks have 
developed or plan to develop green products and/or services based on environmental 
considerations, of which the most notable are energy-efficient mortgage loans (82% of 
respondent banks), followed by green commercial real estate loans (65%), green corporate 
non-retail loans (65%) and green car loans (48%) In addition, EBA survey reports that 58% 
of respondent banks have already issued some type of green or ESG financial instrument 
(54% of them have issued green bonds, 22% covered green bonds, 10% sustainability linked 
bonds, 8% green ABS and 24% other type of sustainable instrument).
4.1 Financial risks associated with climate change
The effects of climate change, and the action undertaken to mitigate them represent not 
only opportunities, but also risks for financial institutions, particularly insurance companies47 
and banks. The risks associated with climate change are classified in two broad categories: 
physical risk and transition risk. 
Physical risks arise from climatic and geological events and from changes in 
ecosystem equilibria (G20 GFSG, 2016), and may manifest themselves suddenly (i.e. linked 
to a specific event such as torrential rain, hurricanes, flooding and other natural catastrophes) 
or manifest themselves gradually (longer-term changes in climate patterns such as, for 
example, a sustained increase in temperatures which may cause a rise in the sea level, 
chronic heatwaves or desertification). In any event, they entail physical damage to the assets 
of households and firms, disruptions to the supply chain or greater expenditure needed to 
deal with them (TCFD, 2017). 
Transition risks arise from efforts to move towards a low-carbon economy 
as a response to climate change. Thus, changes in policies, regulations (such as CO2 
emission limits or carbon taxes), technologies and consumer preferences may prompt 
45  However, as noted by Marqués and Romo (2018), these green syndicated loans are still rare compared with syndicated 
loans to companies in C02-intensive sectors. Moreover, in the period 2009-2017, syndicated loans to oil and gas 
companies increased notably, although those to coal-related companies decreased. The authors conclude that this 
activity may be indicating that the increase in green financing by banks is still be excessively linked to a consideration 
of climate risk from the standpoint of corporate liability, rather than a genuine concern for this type of risk.
46  See EBA (2021a).
47  This paper focuses on the effects of climate change on banks, although insurance is one of the sectors most affected 
by it. A recent report by PwC and CSFI observes that US insurance companies consider the risks posed by climate 
change to be the third most important threat and that reinsurance companies consider them to be the second most 
important (see PWC and CSFI (2017)). In general, analysts consider the insurance sector to be ahead of the banking 
industry in incorporating climate-related factors into its management.
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the reassessment of a wide range of assets, including those of banks and other lenders, 
as climate-related costs and opportunities become apparent.48 
Transition risks will be smaller if the transition is made gradually and in good time, 
such that the policies and regulations implemented allow an orderly shift to investment 
in low-carbon technologies. By contrast, if policies are introduced late and suddenly, 
the transition will be accompanied by a fall in the value of assets, particularly those of 
companies dealing with or highly dependent on the use of fossil fuels (Carney, 2015). 
In this respect, the Prudential Regulatory Authority of the Bank of England (BoE) warns 
that the window of opportunity for an orderly transition is finite and closing (Bank of 
England, 2018).
With the current global warming of 1°C above pre-industrial levels, some of these 
risks are already beginning to crystallise, so financial institutions cannot afford to ignore them. 
According to the IPCC (2014), the risks associated with extreme events, such as heatwaves, 
torrential rain and coastal flooding, are already “moderate”. Furthermore, although the 
transition to a low-carbon economy is a long-term process, some energy transition risks 
may crystallise in the short term if governments decide to implement carbon taxes or other 
restrictions on CO2 emissions.
Physical and transition risks are not independent from each other: the higher the 
transition risk, the lower the future physical risk, and vice versa. Depending on the intensity 
of the policies and actions undertaken to mitigate the effects of climate change, various 
scenarios are possible (see figure 2). Those in which the remedial action is strong and early 
have a higher transition risk but lower physical risk; by contrast, in those envisaging weak 
remedial action, the physical risk is substantial and likely, while the transition risk is lower. 
Also possible are scenarios in which both risks are high, for example those envisaging 
remedial action that is sudden and late, when some of the physical risks are already difficult 
to prevent. Conversely, a timely and orderly transition could mitigate both physical and 
transition risks.49
These physical and transition risks manifest themselves in the typical types of risk 
facing banks, i.e. credit, market, operational, etc. risks. 
Credit risk. First, extreme climatic phenomena may cause significant losses for 
households and firms, reducing their ability to repay loans and impairing the value of their 
assets. For banks, this raises their credit risk insofar as it increases the likelihood of default, 
apart from impairing the value of collateral. This loss of ability to pay and of collateral value 
may also occur in gradual climatic phenomena, for example when the desertification of a 
geographical area weakens its economy. Second, credit risk may increase when a bank 
48  See NGFS (2019a) for a detailed analysis of the relationship between transition and physical risks, the economy and 
the financial system.
49  See NGFS (2020a).
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has credit exposures to firms whose business models are not aligned with the transition 
to a low-carbon economy and which are thus more prone to undergo loss of profit and 
interruption of business and therefore more likely to default on loans and to fail to meet 
other financial obligations, in addition to loss of value of their business. 
Market risk. As noted above, the transition to a low-carbon economy, the policies 
aimed at achieving this objective, the changes in the preferences of economic agents and 
technological progress may lead to substantial and sudden repricing of assets (bonds, 
shares, etc.), particularly if this transition is late, sudden and disorderly. Thus, McGlade 
and Ekins (2015) estimate that limiting global warming to 2ºC would mean that 80% of coal 
reserves, 33% of oil reserves and 50% of gas reserves cannot be used and that the assets 
associated with them would lose value. Technological changes may also affect the value of 
certain assets whenever they bring about sharp shifts in old processes and systems through 
creative destruction (TCFD, 2017). Also, changes in the expectations of consumers, firms and 
investors as to future regulations or technological changes may give rise to sharp changes in 
the value of assets. Additionally, the growing frequency of severe weather phenomena may 
adversely affect actual and potential economic growth in countries vulnerable to climate 
change, thus affecting the value of their sovereign debt by increasing their cost of financing 
and reducing their access to markets.
Operational risk. Severe weather phenomena may affect business continuity, 
including branch networks, offices, infrastructure, processes and staff. The prices of inputs 
such as energy, water and insurance may increase and thus raise operating costs.
Reputational risk. Transition risk may also crystallise in the form of reputational 
risk if customers and investors perceive banks as not being appropriately aligned with the 
objectives of the transition to a low-carbon economy. 
CLIMATE SCENARIOS AND GENERAL IMPLICATIONS
Figure 2
SOURCE: Oliver Wyman (2019).
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Liability/legal risk. These risks can arise if parties who have suffered losses from 
the crystallisation of physical and transition risk factors seek to recover those losses through 
litigation against those they view as responsible.50 This risk may affect banks directly or 
indirectly, i.e. through the impact it may have on firms to which the banks are exposed.
Although physical and transition risks are classified within the ordinary risks facing 
a bank, they have differences from other risks51 which complicate their valuation. Thus, first, 
climate change-related risks are far-reaching since they affect multiple lines of business, 
sectors and geographical areas, so the total impact on the bank, and on the financial 
system, may be greater than for other types of risk. Second, they have a long, undefined 
time horizon. Indeed, the time horizon over which they may crystallise is longer (and less 
well-known) than the time horizons used in business planning and risk assessment. This is 
one of the manifestations which the former Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, 
calls the “tragedy of the horizon”.52 Climate change-related risks are, moreover, foreseeable, 
since there is a high degree of certainty that some combination of physical and transition 
risk will crystallise. Lastly, they are risks which depend on actions to be taken in the short 
term, since the size of the future impact will be largely determined by the actions taken now 
by governments, firms, investors, consumers, banks and other actors, i.e. they are of an 
endogenous nature (see Battiston (2019)).
In addition to the opportunities and risks which climate change entails for banks, 
there is growing pressure from customers, investors and regulators for banks to provide 
public information on their exposures and actions relating to climate change. As noted 
above, this information is necessary to effectively assess climate-related financial risks and 
to efficiently allocate resources. In this respect it is worth mentioning that 190 banks have 
signed the document expressing support for the recommendations of the TCFD, thereby 
committing themselves to publish information on climate change-related risks in accordance 
with the standards set by the TCFD.
4.2 How are banks acting?
The business opportunities for banks offered by the transition to a low-carbon economy, the 
physical and transition risks posed by climate change and the pressures for significant 
publication regarding the financial effects of climate change are factors which, although 
they will manifest themselves most strongly in the future, are already taking place, as noted 
above. For example, there is evidence of the increasing frequency of adverse weather 
50  For example, in January 2019, the Californian company PG&E (Pacific Gas and Electricity) filed for bankruptcy 
protection in view of the legal proceedings for more $30 billion claiming liability in the 2017 and 2018 forest fires which 
devastated its geographical area of operations. According to experts, these fires, preceded by severe drought, were 
a consequence of climate change and PG&E was accused of not having implemented technological innovations and 
preventive measures which would have mitigated the damage. According to analysts, cases such as this will become 
increasingly frequent.
51  See Bank of England (2018) and NGFS (2019b).
52  The tragedy of the horizon manifests itself as a result of the fact that the catastrophic impacts of climate change 
will basically materialise beyond the traditional decision horizons of economic agents, i.e. firms, investors, banks, 
governments, central banks, etc. The materialisation of climate change risks is, in short, a cost for future generations 
which the current generation does not have a strong incentive to alleviate. See Carney (2015).
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events. The share of weather-related catastrophe losses has increased steadily to account 
for over 80% of insured catastrophe losses in 2018 (see ESRB (2020)). And some policies 
aimed at compliance with the objectives of the Paris agreement are already in place in some 
countries, while technological innovations are being rolled out which will have more or less 
success in the future. 
As a result of the foregoing, banks, which had until recently relegated climate change 
matters exclusively to the sphere of corporate social responsibility, are increasingly taking 
into consideration the opportunities and risks associated with climate change, making them 
part of their central business management. 
A survey by the Bank of England in 2018 of 90% of the UK banking sector concluded53 
that 30% of the sector could be classified as simply “responsible”, i.e. they view climate-
related risk from the standpoint of corporate social responsibility, focusing on reputational 
risks; 60% of the sector can be classified as “responsive”, an approach where climate 
change is viewed as a financial risk, albeit from a relatively narrow, short-term perspective; 
and 10% can be classified as “strategic”, i.e. a more comprehensive approach taking a 
long-term view of the financial risks and opportunities, which includes engaging at board 
level and so supporting an orderly transition. The Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de 
Résolution (ACPR), also conducted a survey in 2018 to banks and insurance companies. 
On this basis it concludes that there has been significant progress in last years regarding 
the governance of climate change risks and that they are gradually being incorporated 
into the management of financial risk. However, it also notes that progress is uneven and 
that there is still a considerable lack of operational adaptation of business strategies.54
Sabine Lautenschläger (2019), former Executive Board member of the ECB, 
referred to a pilot project conducted by the ECB to obtain information on how banks are 
approaching the challenges posed by climate change issues. The project concluded that, 
although banks are mindful of climate change risks, most of them address these issues 
from the standpoint of corporate social responsibility rather than from the standpoint 
of risk management. Coleton et al. (2020) reach similar conclusions based on a survey 
conducted among 39 European banks in Spring 2019. The results of the survey show a 
clear trend towards banks embedding sustainability into their business strategies, through 
a variety of channels and as a result of a mix of underlying motivations, ranking first ethical 
business considerations, followed by business opportunities and with risk considerations 
ranking only in a fifth position. Many banks stated that there are still challenges with regard 
to implementing sustainability more systematically within their business, with the most 
cited reasons being time horizon, awaiting regulatory proposals and lack of understanding 
of the potential impacts of climate change. The survey also demonstrates that governance 
arrangements and risk management processes applicable to climate-related risks are 
developing, at varying degrees across institutions. 
53  See Bank of England (2018).
54  For more details on the banking sector, see ACPR (2019a), and for the insurance sector, see ACPR (2019b). 
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Overall, despite the growing acknowledgment that climate-related risks deserve 
attention from a prudential risk management perspective, the actual incorporation in the risk 
management framework, the development of proper risk management functions to handle 
these risks and the elaboration of robust risk identification and assessment tools are still at 
preliminary stages. More recent surveys show clear progress, at least among the biggest 
institutions, although this progress is still insufficient. Thus, in a survey conducted by GARP 
in 2020 among 43 banks and 28 other financial institutions across all geographies, 55% of 
respondent firms describe their approach to climate risks as strategic and more than 90% 
of the firms aim to have a strategic approach in the next five years (see GARP Risk Institute 
(2020)). Also, over 90% of firms report some degree of involvement at the board level. 
However, GARP concludes that climate risk measurement approaches are immature 
being mostly qualitative with more than 25% of firms not using either metrics, targets 
or limits in their climate related risk management and only other 25% use all three.55 
Over 40% of respondents do not use scenario analysis, 43% used it on an ad-hoc basis 
and only 10% of them use it as a regular part of risk assessment. Overall, respondents find 
several barriers and challenges to addressing climate risks, being most concerned about 
the availability of reliable models, regulatory uncertainty and getting internal alignment on 
climate risk strategy, although these challenges are expected to diminish over time.
Regarding disclosure, the ECB carried out an assessment exercise of climate 
related and environmental risk disclosures of 107 significant institutions and 18 less 
significant institutions in the reference year 2019. In its assessment, the ECB recognizes 
a clear positive trend in the level of climate-related disclosures over the past two years, 
with good practices spreading rapidly across institutions. However, the ECB concludes 
that, in general, institutions do not yet comprehensively disclose their risk profile and that 
significant efforts are needed to improve transparency. Thus, although most of the assessed 
institutions refer to climate-related risks in their public disclosures in some form, most of 
them do so in their annual report, with only a limited number of institutions disclosing 
information on the outcome of their materiality assessment. On business strategy, less 
than one third of the institutions assessed disclose the potential impact of transition 
risk on their business model in the short and long term. This proportion is even smaller for 
physical risk. In both cases, they make no clear distinction available between short-term and 
longer-term assessments. On governance, only half of the institutions provide disclosures on 
the board’s oversight of either climate-related risks or climate-related opportunities. On risk 
management, one in two institutions described their processes for identifying, assessing 
and managing climate-related risks, of which only a minority have done so comprehensively. 
Less than one quarter of institutions refer to the use of climate-related scenario analysis in 
their disclosures and even fewer refer to stress testing, although many institutions disclose 
that work in these areas is under way. Institutions that have integrated climate-related risks 
in their credit risk management policies typically refer to the use of a combination of sectoral 
approaches, ranging from the exclusion of certain sectors to heightened engagement with 
55  A metric is a measure used to assess climate risk. A target is the outcome the organization aims to achieve. Limits 
represent the worst outcome the organization is prepared to accept without taking corrective action. 
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clients in identified sectors. On metrics and targets, just over one third of the institutions 
assessed disclose both targets and metrics, and only a minority discloses quantitative 
information about the carbon intensity of their portfolios (see ECB (2020a)). 
In sum, clear advances have been made, but there is still much ground to be covered. 
This is partly because the challenges and obstacles to the proper management of climate 
change-related opportunities and risks are substantial (see Box 2), as pointed out by many 
of the respondents to the surveys mentioned above. Indeed, right now it is no easy task to 
assess the business opportunities associated with the transition.56 Assessing the risks is also 
complicated, since it calls for designing possible scenarios, knowing the economic impact 
on each of those scenarios, valuing the financial risks which that economic impact may 
involve, having a projection and action horizon longer than the standard one, etc. In short, as 
concluded by Monnin (2018a), the assessment of climate-related risks requires methodologies 
which are based on forward-looking scenarios and complex links between cause and effect, 
and that use data and information not observed in the past. All this also requires having a 
generally accepted taxonomy of what is green and what is not, as well as new, harmonised 
methodologies to ensure that the analyses conducted by different banks are comparable.
In contrast, banks have continued lending to the fossil fuel sectors. Hence, the 
world’s largest investment banks have provided more than $1.9tn of financing for the fossil 
fuel companies most aggressively expanding in new coal, oil and gas projects during the 
period 2015-2019 (see Chenet et al. (2021)) and ECB finds that in the Eurozone loans 
extended to carbon-intensity have mostly increased during 2015-2019 (see ECB (2020b)). 
Nevertheless, some significant steps are taking place, as pointed out before. Thus 
the baking sector has started to make public commitments to be aligned with the objectives 
of the Paris agreement and the role it implies for the financial sector through the sign of 
comprises, such as the Principles of Responsible Banking under the UNEP Fi initiative with 
more than 200 banks (more than a third of the global banking industry) that joined in 2019 
under six principles regarding alignment of the business strategy, impact and target setting, 
work responsibly with their clients, engage stakeholders, implementation through an effective 
governance and culture and implementation of transparency and accountability. Some of 
these banks signed the Collective Commitment to Climate Action in 2019 to achieve a more 
ambitious framework to contribute to limit global warming to well-below 2°C through their 
services and lending. In Spain, a similar compromise was signed in December 2019 in the 
25 COP held in Madrid. More than the 95% of the sector presented a joint commitment to 
proceed within a certain period of time to reduce the carbon footprint in their credit portfolios.
More recently, in April 2021, 43 banks from 23 countries (with assets of $28.5 trillion) 
formed the UN-convened Net-Zero Banking Alliance (NZBA) with its members committing 
56  For instance, in the EBA risk Assessment Questionnaire of June 2019, 65% of the respondent banks report corporate 
and social responsibility among the main motivation for developing green products and services, while business 
opportunities are marked as a main motivation only for 45% of respondent banks (see EBA (2019a)).
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to align their lending and investment portfolios with net-zero emissions by 2050. The 
commitment includes the setting of an intermediate target for 2030 and accountability by 
publishing annually absolute emissions and emissions intensity in line with best practice and 
within a year of setting targets, disclose progress against a board-level reviewed transition 
strategy. NBZA is the banking element of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net-Zero 
(GFANZ).57 Santander, Caixabank and BBVA are among the signatories’ banks.
57  GFANZ is a strategic forum bringing together the leading net-zero initiatives across the financial sector, and is chaired 
by Mark Carney, UN Special Envoy on Climate Action and Finance. GFANZ is the place where the financial sector 
meets to accelerate the transition of finance and the global economy to net-zero emissions by 2050 at the latest.
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5 The central banks also talk about climate 
Central banks’ responsibilities regarding bank supervision, financial stability, asset 
management and monetary policy also make it necessary for them to analyse the potential 
systemic implications they may have for the economy and the financial system as a whole 
in order to incorporate climate-change issues into their supervisory and macro-prudential 
practices and into the portfolio management of their own portfolios.
The results of the survey conducted by NGFS (2020b), asking to 26 central 
banks representing 51 countries, confirms an increasing awareness of climate-related 
risks among central banks. There is a general understanding that climate change poses 
a challenge for central banks however, in practice central banks are still at an early stage 
when it comes to considering adjustments to their operational frameworks to incorporate 
climate change-related factors. The recognition by central banks that climate related 
risks should be taking into account in their areas of work and their awareness that the 
tasks involved are complex and require international coordination. 
The creation of the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the 
Financial System (NGFS) in December 2017, has driven the work of Central banks in this 
area with a view to exchanging experience and knowledge of climate change-related 
matters, identifying best practices and promoting green finance. The Network groups 
together 95 central banks and supervisory authorities and 15 observers in June 202158 
identifying best practices and promoting green finance. The NGFS’s report released in April 
2019 made a series of recommendations for central banks and policymakers (see Box 3). 
Since then, the NGFS, has published several reports and guides on implementation of these 
recommendations and has become a catalyst in raising awareness towards climate related 
issues and need for action by central banks and international standard setting bodies. 
Specifically, as described in this section, central banks are incorporating climate change 
issues into their supervisory practices and gathering information from supervised institutions on 
their exposure to climate-related risks. In the last years they have increasingly recognised the 
need to incorporate the implications of climate change into their financial stability analyses and 
to develop specific climate stress tests on the financial systems. At the same time, central banks 
have started to incorporate sustainable and responsible principles to the management of their 
own portfolios. Regarding the recognition by central banks that climate related issues affect 
their areas of work include price stability and the transmission of monetary policy, although the 
way to address the challenge that poses climate change in this area, is still under study. 
5.1 Micro- and macro-prudential supervision and financial stability
Where physical and transition risks affect financial institutions, as we have seen in section 4.1, 
the central banks or supervisors (if this task is not entrusted to the central bank) should, 
58  See the list of members: https://www.ngfs.net/en/about-us/membership.
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as part of their function of overseeing the security and solvency of supervised institutions, 
take into consideration the risks posed by climate change. In this respect, central banks 
have to incorporate climate change issues into their supervisory practices and gather 
information from supervised institutions on their exposure to climate-related risks, on their 
management thereof and on their policies and governance in relation to climate change and 
to the transition to a low-carbon economy. As for financial institutions, this is no easy task for 
central banks. Yet they also need to comprehend climate risk and build skills.
Climate change-related risks are systemic in nature, since they affect all economies 
and may have a large impact. Regarding physical risk, natural disasters may give rise to the 
total or nearly total disruption of economic activity, to scarcity of resources, to prolonged 
interruption of supplies of vital resources and to the need to devote considerable funds to 
reconstruction. For their part, physical risks of a gradual nature may give rise to depopulation 
and a significant loss of economic potential. Large-scale migratory phenomena and political 
instability are also systemic risks to be taken into account. 
In the absence of resolute action by governments and other economic agents, the 
physical impact of climate change in the second half of the century will be substantial. As 
mentioned by the NGFS (2019b), some studies estimate that average global income may 
decrease by 25% towards the end of the century and that the value of privately owned assets 
will also fall substantially, with an expected loss of as much as $7-13 trillion, depending on 
the degree of warming reached in 2100 (see Economist Intelligence Unit (2015)). Dietz et al. 
(2016) find that under a scenario that lacks a policy for transitioning to a low-carbon economy 
(scenario with warming of 2.5°C), the expected value at risk (VaR) of the global private non-bank 
assets in existence in 2013 would be 1.8%, equivalent to approximately $2.5 trillion. Most of 
the risk is in the tail, with a VaR in the 99th percentile of 16.7%, or $24.2 trillion.
Furthermore, the transition to a low-carbon economy, which entails far-reaching 
economic structural change, also has costs and risks which affect financial stability.59 The 
transition may involve substantial losses in the value of some assets (stranded assets), sharp 
appreciation of others, mis-matched prices and excessive volatility, with the consequent 
harm for owners and issuers and for the financial system in general. Dafermos et al. (2018) 
analyse the effects of climate change, using and simulating a model called DEFINE (Dynamic-
Ecosystem-FINance-Economy), which depicts interactions between the ecosystem, the 
financial system and the macroeconomy. They conclude that financial stability is affected 
in three ways. First, the economic catastrophes resulting from climate change would 
destroy the capital of firms, reducing their profitability and prompting a rise in corporate 
bad debts that would affect financial and non-financial firms. Second, climate damage may 
lead to a reallocation of assets which would cause a gradual deterioration in the price of 
corporate bonds. And third, the adverse macroeconomic effects would lead to a decrease 
in credit, thus exacerbating the macroeconomic deterioration. The study of the ESRB (2016) 
59  See FSB (2020) for a stocktake of financial authorities’ experience in including physical and transition climate risks as 
part of their financial stability monitoring.
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argues that while the systemic risks of a gradual transition to a low-carbon economy are 
limited, those of a late and sudden transition would be considerable, acting through the 
macroeconomic impact of sudden changes in the use of energy, with a possible scarcity of 
supply of alternative energies due to sharp appreciation of carbon-intensive assets, and also 
through an increase in the incidence of natural catastrophes. 
The extent of the potential systemic risk to the financial system associated with 
climate damage and the transition to a low-carbon economy has aroused concern among 
central banks as the institutions responsible for ensuring financial stability. Since the address 
entitled “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon: Climate Change and Financial Stability” in 
2015 by the former Governor of the Bank of England (BoE), Mark Carney, central banks have 
increasingly recognised the need to incorporate the implications of climate change into their 
financial stability analyses and into their stress tests on the financial systems overseen by 
them (see Carney (2015)). 
This mission would require central banks carry out economic impact analyses 
under different scenarios and the consequent financial impact in each of them, which is an 
exercise entailing similar or greater difficulties than those facing banks (see Box 2). Indeed, 
the assessment of financial risks requires two ingredients: data which are hard to obtain and 
innovative modelling of dynamic interactions between the real economy, the financial system, 
climate change and transition policies. The first element, data availability was identified as 
the most cited challenge in the survey realized by BCBS (2020). And the latter ingredient 
is exacting because, first, the existing models of the interactions between the economy 
(Integrated Assessment Models, IAM)60 and the climate do not include the financial channel; 
and, second, the models generally used by central banks in their macroeconomic analyses 
do not include factors relating to climate change and the energy transition and do not take 
into account the interaction of heterogeneous agents in an environment of fundamental 
uncertainty (see Campiglio et al. (2018)).61
There is a broad and growing consensus among central banks that the effects of 
climate change and of the transition to a sustainable economy should be incorporated into 
their micro- and macro-prudential supervisory work, basically through the use of Pillar 2 
and Pillar 3 instruments, i.e. requiring banks to assess their exposure to climate change, 
to conduct stress-testing exercises which address climate change-related risks62 and to 
publish the attendant information. They also agree on the need to develop methodologies 
that take into account those effects when assessing the effect of climate change and the 
60  These models are based on the pioneering work of the winner of the 2018 Nobel Prize in economics, W. D. Nordhaus, 
Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change, MIT Press, 1994.
61  However, notable progress is being made in macroeconomic-climate-financial modelling. See for example: Balint 
et al. (2017), Fontana and Sawyer (2016), Monasterolo and Raberto (2018), Dafermos et al. (2017), Dafermos et al. 
(2018), Stolbova et al. (2018), Bovari et al. (2018), Lamperti et al. (2018), Roncoroni et al. (2019) and others.
62  The Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board proposed in 2016 the incorporation of climate-related 
risks in stress tests and the inclusion of a hard landing in the adverse macroeconomic scenario. In the medium term, it 
also proposed the development of specific “carbon stress tests”, albeit acknowledging that their methodology is under 
development and depends on the emission paths considered (ESRB, 2016).
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transition on the financial system as a whole. They further concur on the need to conduct 
stress tests to assess the resilience of the financial system to the effects of climate change 
and of the transition.63
5.2  Integration of sustainability factors, “green” use of monetary policy  
and prudential instruments
Following NGFS recommendation number two regarding the integration of sustainability factors 
into own portfolio management,64 numerous central banks have made the commitment of 
integrating sustainability factors into own-portfolio management.65 For example, the Eurosystem 
central banks —the 19 national central banks of the euro area countries and the European 
Central Bank (ECB)— announced in February 2021, that they have defined a common stance 
for applying sustainable and responsible investment principles in the euro-denominated non-
monetary policy portfolios that they each manage under their own responsibility.66 Regarding 
the disclosure of climate-related financial risk of their portfolios and operations,67 the number 
of central banks than have committed to disclose is only a few by now, but it is increasing. In 
this vein, in 2020, the Bank of England published its first climate related financial disclosure, 
setting out its approach to managing the risks from climate change across its entire operations, 
and the steps taken to improve the central bank’s understanding of these risks.68 The 
Sveriges Riksbank has taken a first step towards disclosure of its own climate-related risks 
on the Riksbank’s balance sheet by calculating and reporting the carbon footprint of the 
holdings of corporate bonds. National central banks of the Eurosystem also aims to start 
to disclosure about climate-related issues for their non-monetary policy portfolios within 
the next two years, using the recommendations of the TCFD as the initial framework and 
reporting, as a minimum, in the category of metrics and targets, as announced in February 
2021.69,70 Concerning Eurosystem monetary policy portfolio, the ECB has committed, in the 
context of its new monetary policy strategy, to start disclosing climate-related information of 
the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) by the first quarter of 2023.71
The recognition by central banks that climate related issues affect their areas of 
work Include price stability and the transmission of monetary policy. Thus, in an address 
63  See NGFS (2020c) for a higher detail on how supervisors can integrate climate-related and environmental risks into 
prudential supervision and BCBS (2021) for measurement methodologies of climate-related financial risks. 
64  See NGFS recommendations in Box 3.
65  See NGFS (2019c) y (2020d).
66  See Press Release “Eurosystem agrees on common stance for climate change-related sustainable investments 
in non-monetary policy portfolios” 4 February 2021. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ecb.
pr210204_1~a720bc4f03.en.html.
67  In the NGFS (2021) Technical Document “Adapting central bank operations to a hotter world. Reviewing some options” 
is stated that “Central banks may wish to disclose information on their own exposures to climate-related risks and 
on their climate strategy and performance. This would help set a positive example to assist market participants in 
developing their own disclosure frameworks and incorporating climate related considerations into their investment and 
lending decisions.”
68  In June 2021, Bank of England published the second annual climate disclosure report.
69  See section 5.4.
70  Several Eurosystem central banks already make climate-related disclosures for some of their non-monetary policy 
portfolios (see section 5.4).
71  See Press Release “ECB presents action plan to include climate change considerations in its monetary policy strategy” 
8 July 2021. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2021/html/ecb.pr210708_1~f104919225.en.html.
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in November 2018, Benoît Coeuré,72 former ECB Executive Board member, remarked that 
monetary policy is affected by climate change whether there is or not action to mitigate climate 
change effects, in his opinion, if action is not taken to counter climate change, identification 
of the major shocks for medium-term inflation projections will be more complex. Also, the 
most likely natural catastrophes may erode the conventional monetary policy space with 
greater frequency, raising the number of occasions on which central banks have to face a 
trade-off between stable prices and growth. On the other hand, if action is taken to counter 
climate change, the impact on monetary policy may be equally significant, particularly 
if the change associated with the energy mix alters relative prices so as to destabilise 
medium-term inflation expectations.
The Governor of the Banque de France, François Villeroy (2019), considers that the 
effects of climate change may give rise to inflationary tension in the medium term through 
their impact on agricultural and energy prices. Moreover, extreme weather conditions may 
have a broader impact on the economy, affecting GDP and price structures. In this situation, 
monetary policy will face sustained shocks whose impact extends throughout the economy, 
and will have to play its role to achieve gradual price structure rebalancing, in line with its 
ultimate objective of price stability. 
Several other central bankers have made statements in the same line. Governor 
of Banco de España, Pablo Hernández de Cos (2021), pointed out that the effects that 
climate change and policies aimed at promoting the transition towards a carbon neutral 
economy may have on headline inflation and natural interest rate could lead central banks 
to rethink how to formulate their policies in pursuit of price stability over the medium time 
horizon. Andrew Bailey (2021a), Governor of the Bank of England, remarked that the effects 
of climate change matter for monetary policy because structural shifts in the supply side of 
the economy can affect not only future point-in-time macroeconomic variables, but also the 
expected natural rate of interest and the natural rate of unemployment.73 
Once again, this is no easy task in view of the difficulty of predicting the nature, 
frequency and intensity of climate change effects and the path of transition policies. Against 
this backdrop, Villeroy (2019) considers it necessary for central banks to improve their 
understanding of how to conduct monetary policy in a setting of climate change and of 
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and, to this end, the forecasting models 
normally used by central banks, developed to analyse medium-term trends, will have to be 
reviewed. Hernández de Cos (2021) also deems necessary to step out efforts to develop the 
tools and models needed to have better answers for the implications of climate change on 
the economy and on monetary policy. NGFS (2020e) concludes that central banks need to 
reinforce their analytical toolkit by considering adding climate risks to their macroeconomic 
models and forecasting tools. In particular, issues that require model upgrades include the 
estimation of the impact of climate change on the natural interest rate, the identification 
72  See Coeuré (2018).
73  See also Christine Lagarde (2021).
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and propagation of climate-related shocks, and the impact of transition policies. To this end, 
NGFS recommends that central banks embrace an interdisciplinary approach to research the 
impacts of climate change, and how to best reflect these impacts in macroeconomic models.
Against this background, the ECB announced in July 2021, in the context of its 
monetary policy strategy review, its climate change action plan that includes a commitment 
to further incorporating climate change considerations into its monetary policy framework 
and to expanding its analytical capacity in macroeconomic modelling, statistics and 
monetary policy with regard to climate change (see Box 4).
However, the active role which central banks could play in fostering green finance, i.e. in 
ensuring ready availability of the funds needed to achieve a low-carbon economy, through the 
use of monetary policy and prudential instruments (green asset purchases, differing reserve 
requirements, differing regulatory capital requirements, liquidity ratios which favour green 
finance, sectoral leverage ratios, constraints on “brown” credit, etc.) is more controversial.74 
The proponents of the “green” use of these tools argue that, although the transition 
to a low-carbon economy is primarily the responsibility of governments through investment 
programmes, regulatory measures (e.g. energy efficiency measures) and taxes (e.g. a carbon tax), 
financial market failures prevent asset prices from accurately reflecting costs and positive 
and negative externalities. This means there are insufficient incentives to mobilise the 
necessary financing for the transition to a low-carbon economy, which may also adversely 
affect financial stability. It is also argued that the prudential regulation entailed by Basel III 
contains elements which discourage green financing by banks. Thus D’Oracio, Monnin and 
Popoyan (2019) maintain that regulatory capital and liquidity ratios do not take into account 
climate change risks in exposures. That is tantamount to omitting a source of risk in some 
assets (those that are carbon-intensive) and, thereby, to promoting its financing along with 
an inappropriate allocation of credit to the detriment of green assets.
Against this background, in the European arena, including the European Parliament, there 
have been various proposals for the corporate bond programmes of the ECB (CSPP) and the BoE 
to include green finance criteria (what has come to be known as “green QE”), or even to launch a 
special “green assets” purchase programme. The ECB observes the “market neutrality” principle, 
i.e. in the purchased portfolio it maintains the maturity structure and the sectoral mix of the total 
outstanding bonds.75 Various studies conclude that the application of this neutrality principle results 
in carbon-intensive sectors bias, given the higher volume, rating and liquidity of bonds isued by 
carbon-intensive entities. It thus contributes to an inadequate assessment of climate-related risks 
—with possible adverse effects on financial stability— and to the failure to meet its commitments 
to support the mobilisation of funds to finance the transition (see, for example, Monnin (2018b), 
Matikainen et al. (2017), Battiston and Monasterolo (2019) and Shoenmaker (2019)). 
74  For a detailed set of possible actions to be taken by central banks to actively contribute to a net-zero economy see 
Dikau et al. (2021a) and Dikau et al. (2021b).
75  See ECB (2018).
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Thus, Matikainen et al. (2017) find that the portfolios acquired by both the ECB 
and the BoE are biased towards firms with carbon-intensive activities. They estimate that 
in 62% of the ECB’s corporate bond purchases, the issuers are firms from the sectors, 
such as energy and industry, responsible for 59% of greenhouse gas emissions, while 
accounting for 18% of gross value added. In the case of the BoE, 49% of its purchases are 
from issuers which altogether are responsible for 52% of greenhouse gas emissions and 
contribute only 12% of gross value added. Battiston and Monasterolo (2019), using more 
granular information at the NACE4 level, which allows a more accurate calculation of the 
degree of carbon usage, reach the same conclusion: the bonds issued by carbon-intensive 
companies, particularly those from sectors such as carbon-intensive transport, fossil fuels, 
carbon-intensive energy and other “utilities”, are those accounting for the highest share 
of the corporate bond asset purchase programme (APP) portfolio. Papoutsi et al. (2021) 
compare the sectoral distribution of the “ market portfolio76 to the ECB’s current holdings 
under its corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP), finding that ECB´s corporate bond 
portfolio is tilted towards high emission sectors. More specifically, they find that relative to 
the market portfolio, the ECB holds a large share of carbon-intensive sectors, suggesting 
that there is a strong positive correlation between emissions and ECB holdings by sector. 
This bias is explained by the fact that carbon-intensive companies, such as oil and gas 
companies and car manufacturers, are typically also capital intensive and thus issue more 
corporate bonds
In view of this carbon-intensive bias in asset purchases, Matikainen et al. (2017) 
consider that the ECB and the BoE should analyse the impact of their asset purchase policies 
on the price of carbon-intensive assets and, if they conclude they are contributing to a price 
misaligned with risk, should act accordingly. Monnin (2018b) considers that central banks should 
include an assessment of climate-related risks in their asset purchase criteria and collateral 
policy. Shoenmaker (2019) proposes that asset purchase criteria and collateral assessment 
should gradually introduce a penalty factor proportional to the intensity of CO2 usage of the 
issuers of the assets purchased. They argue that in this way the maturity structure of the current 
portfolio would not be altered. A similar proposal is made by Battiston and Monasterolo (2019). 
Dafermos et al. (2018) calibrate a model in which they introduce green QE and conclude that 
it would have beneficial effects for the financing of the transition; however, for those effects 
to be significant, green QE would have to be supplemented by other government measures. 
Monasterolo and Raberto (2018) also calibrate the effect of a green bond purchase programme 
and find beneficial effects on green investment and other macroeconomic variables, though 
these purchases would have a negative effect on income inequality. 
Central banks, and specifically Eurosystem central banks, did not shown, at first, 
much enthusiasm for green QE. Thus, the governor of the Bundesbank, J. Weidmann 
(2017), regarding the possibility of using bond purchases or collateral policy to promote 
76  Ideally, market portfolio should be constructed with the market value of equity plus debt. Since the market value of 
equity is not available for non-listed firms, the authors use alternative measures such capital income (value added 
minus wages) by sector.
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green finance, considers that the Eurosystem mandate is to maintain price stability and that, 
to achieve this objective, monetary policy should not be overloaded with other objectives. 
Also, neutrality is a basic principle of the Eurosystem operational framework. Hence, to 
avoid opening Pandora’s Box, green bonds should not be afforded preferential treatment 
either in the APP or in collateral policy. A somewhat more ambiguous stance is taken by 
the ECB Executive Board Member B. Coeuré (2018), who considers that the ECB, acting in 
accordance with its mandate, can and should actively support the transition to a low-carbon 
economy in two main ways: first, by helping define the rules of play; and second, by acting 
in consequence, without harming price stability. Draghi (2018) considers that the corporate 
bond APP’s ultimate objective is to contribute to achieving price stability. Therefore, to 
avoid market distortions and safeguard competition, asset purchases should proceed in 
accordance with the principle of neutrality and risk management, avoiding any discrimination 
regarding the activity of the issuer.77 The governor of the Banque de France, François Villeroy 
(2019), considers that green QE could introduce distortions into the market, given the scant 
volume of the green bond market, and that the consideration of climate-related factors in 
collateral policy requires a deeper knowledge of climate risks and a taxonomy which clearly 
distinguishes green from carbon-intensive activities. 
More recently, however, European central banks have shown a more open mind 
towards a more active role. Thus, Andrew Bailey (2021b), governor of Bank of England, claims 
that for them, the need to act in greening monetary policy is clear and unambiguous. First, 
given the financial markets mispricing of climate risks, “continuing to replicate the structure of 
the sterling corporate bond market, without taking explicit account of the climate impact 
of bond issuers, is no longer in fact a truly ‘market neutral’ approach”. Second, given the 
remit for MPC of March 2021 that states that, subject to achieving price stability, the MPC 
should support the transition to net-zero as part of the government’s economic strategy. 
Consequently, Bank of England is planning to modify its approach to the composition of 
assets in the CBPS in order to take account of climate considerations, although the CBPS will 
remain a monetary policy tool for achieving its primary inflation objective. The principles of 
the greening the CBPS would be: i) incentivise companies to take decisive action to achieve 
net zero, ii) lead by example, learn from others, iii) in increase the requirements over time.78 
Isabelle Schnabel and Frank Elderson, ECB board members, have also questioned 
the market neutrality principle of the corporate assets programs run by the ECB. In a 
podcast by Elderson and Schnabel (2021), Elderson, in reference to the ECB corporate 
bond purchases, says that if the conclusion is that the market is not pricing in everything 
that needs to be priced in, then just blindly following the market might make ECB markets 
neutral, but it might not be in line with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, that In the end, is what needs to 
be ECB guiding principle. Schnabel says that sticking to the market neutrality principle may 
77  However, under this policy the ECB has purchased a small amount of green bonds (proportional to the scant volume 
of green bonds which now exists), and, in view of this, Draghi (2018) asserts that the ECB can thus be considered to 
contribute to green finance.
78  See the Discussion Paper published by Bank of England (2021a).
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reinforce existing biased of corporate bonds purchases towards carbon-intensive issuers 
and, in turn, delay the transition towards a carbon-free economy. In her opinion, this suggest 
to tilt the ECB asset purchases towards less emission-intensive firms, recognizing that to 
do it in a proper way, is challenging. In any case, she points out, these actions must not 
impede the smooth functioning of monetary policy the precedence of price stability over 
other objectives should remain.79 Similar opinion is held by Klaas Knot, President of the 
Netherlands Bank, that in a Bruegel event in February 2021 stated that “Central banks could 
explore how, within the boundaries of their mandates, they can redesign their monetary policy 
instruments to prevent such biases from occurring, and instead contribute to unlocking more 
green investments”.80
François Villeroy de Galhau, governor of Banque de France, has shown a strong 
opinion in favor of greening ECB´s actions.81 In his opinion, “the Eurosystem’s consideration 
for climate change is neither an abuse of its mission, nor a mere militant conviction or a 
fad; it is an imperative that we must pursue in the very name of our current mandate and to 
ensure the smooth implementation of monetary policy”. Accordingly, he proposes to “start 
decarbonising the ECB’s balance sheet in a pragmatic, gradual and targeted manner for all 
corporate assets, whether they are held on the central bank’s balance sheet (purchases) 
or taken as collateral, without including government securities”. In contrast, Bundesbank 
President Jens Weidmann, claims that central bank should prioritize disclosures but not 
asset allocation. Nonetheless, in January 2021 he argued that central banks should also 
integrate climate-related financial risks into their risk management framework, including the 
financial risks arising from monetary policy operations, remarking that ECB should consider 
only purchasing bonds or accepting them as collateral for monetary policy purposes if their 
issuers meet certain climate-related reporting requirements.82
C. Lagarde (2021) in an speech given in January 2021 stated that the effects that 
climate related risks may have on price stability, on key macroeconomic variables for the 
conduct of monetary policy, on the natural interest rate, on the transmission of monetary 
policy and on the ECB’s balance sheet explains the inclusion of climate related issues in its 
monetary policy strategy review, evaluating the feasibility, efficiency and effectiveness of 
available options for action, ensuring that they are consistent with ECB’s mandate. Consistent 
with this statement, the ECB action plan to include climate change considerations in its 
monetary policy strategy, announced in July 2021, embraces a commitment to including 
climate change considerations in monetary policy operations in the areas of disclosure, risk 
assessment, collateral framework and corporate sector asset purchases (see Box 4). 
Regarding Pillar 1 prudential tools, a proposal which has received special interest is that 
of introducing differentiated regulatory capital requirements such as a “green supporting factor” 
79  See also Schnabel (2021).
80  See Knot (2021).
81  See Villeroy (2021).
82  See Weidmann (2021).
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(GSF), based on a lower risk weight in green exposures when calculating bank regulatory capital 
or, alternatively, a penalty weighting for carbon-intensive exposures (a “brown penalising factor”, 
BPF), suggested, inter alia, by the European Parliament, the Commissioner V. Dombrosvskis and 
the Euro Banking Association. The proponents of these measures argue that a GSF, or a BPF, 
would align regulatory capital requirements more appropriately with the risks actually taken, in 
addition to encouraging green finance. 
In general, analysts and academics do not consider the introduction of a GSF 
to be appropriate for the time being. They argue that the available evidence that green 
assets have a lower risk is not conclusive and that its introduction would tighten the capital 
position of banks which currently face rather uncomfortable capital levels. This could 
have adverse consequences for financial stability (see, for example, Dankert et al. (2018), 
Boot and Shoenmaker (2018), D’Orazio and Popoyan (2019), European Financial Services 
Roundtable (2017)). By contrast, the BPF has merited greater support. It is considered to 
be more in line with prudential regulation, being based on risk, since the increase in capital 
it would entail would provide a higher buffer for banks with which to address the possible 
asset impairment caused by a faster transition to a low-carbon economy. That would in turn 
discourage investments contributing to climate change, which may reduce systemic risk 
(see, for example, Monnin (2018b), D’Oracio and Popoyan (2019), Boot and Schoenmaker 
(2018), and Campligio et al. (2018)). However, the introduction of BPF would have to be 
preceded by a clear “brown” asset taxonomy83 and new methodologies to assess credit risk, 
since the models based on historical data are not applicable because the energy transition 
is a new phenomenon.
Central banks are not, at least for now, very sympathetic to the introduction of 
differentiated capital requirements, particularly of a GSF. Thus, M. Carney (2018), former 
governor of the Bank of England, is not much in favour of the introduction of a GSF, arguing 
that central banks cannot replace governments in their responsibilities for meeting the 
objectives set in the Paris Agreement. He is, however, less contrary to the introduction of a 
BPF for those exposures which are demonstrated to be ecologically harmful and, therefore, 
to constitute a high risk. The same position has been expressed by the governor of the 
Banque de France, F. Villeroy de Galhau (2018). Sabine Lautenschläger, former ECB Executive 
Board member (2019), considered that any change in the prudential framework must be 
based solely on prudential criteria. In general, central banks consider that economic policy 
criteria have no place in their prudential policy and, therefore, only if it is proven that green 
assets entail lower risk than others, or that carbon-intensive assets entail a differentially high 
risk compared with other exposures, can the introduction of a GSF or BSF be considered. 
However, such a check requires empirical analytical evidence which is currently not available 
and, furthermore, an accurate taxonomy of what is green and what is brown. This same 
position is held by the NGFS (2018) and, therefore, by a good number of central banks. 
Against this background, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has the mandate to assess 
83  The Platform on Sustainable Finance has the mandate of the European Commission to advise on the design of a 
taxonomy of activities that significantly harm the environment.
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if a dedicated prudential treatment of exposures related to assets or activities associated 
substantially with environmental and/or social objectives would be justified and the findings 
should be summarised in a report due in 2025 (see Article 501c of CRR2 and EBA’s Action 
Plan in EBA (2019b)). However, the Renewed Strategy for Sustainable Finance launched by 
the European Commission in July 2021 proposes to bring forward to 2023 this assessment 
(European Commission, 2021). 
5.3 A matter of mandate 
Clearly, the extent of involvement of central banks in climate change depends basically on 
their mandate and on the interpretation of that mandate. Most banks, particularly Western 
ones, set their main objective as price stability. This main objective is based on the theoretical 
and empirical understanding that low, stable inflation is a necessary condition for growth or 
development. Apart from low, stable inflation, safeguarding financial stability is another of 
the functions generally entrusted to central banks.84 Also, a large number of central banks 
are responsible for the prudential supervision of financial institutions. These mandates are 
what justify the consideration of climate change and energy transition issues in micro- and 
macro-prudential supervision, and in oversight of the monitoring of the effects on price 
stability. That said, they are not a remit to actively foster sustainability and green finance 
(see Dikau and Volz (2018)).
Yet if central banks are to adopt an active role through the establishment of 
incentives for green finance or of penalties for carbon-intensive finance, they require an 
express legal mandate on environmental and sustainability objectives (see Dikau and Volz 
(2018)). This is necessary in view of the potential distortions which direct intervention to 
promote green finance may cause in the markets and the possible clash with their objectives. 
Dikau and Volz (2019a) analyse the mandates of 133 central banks and conclude that only 16 
of them are expressly entrusted with promoting sustainable growth. The mandate of another 
38 central banks includes as a secondary objective the achievement of the government’s 
economic policy objectives, though it is subordinate to that of price stability. As noted by 
Dikau and Volz (2019b), this almost invariably includes sustainable growth under the Paris 
Agreement.85 According to NGFS (2020b), that realized a review of 107 central banks with 
the aim of analyzing their institutional frameworks and balance sheet features, few central 
banks have a mandate that explicitly refers to “sustainability” as a central bank objective, 
while references to “economic development” are more common. Almost half of central 
banks have price stability as their sole explicit primary objective, almost one-quarter of 
84  This responsibility for financial stability is often shared with the government and other supervisors or with an 
independent authority.
85  The ECB is an example of a central bank where sustainable growth is a secondary objective, subordinate to price 
stability. Thus, Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes that: “The primary 
objective of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ESCB’) shall be to maintain price 
stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic 
policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in 
Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union. For its part, Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that “The 
Union… shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price 
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level 
of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment…”. (our emphasis).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 54 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2126
all central bank mandates reviewed explicitly list sustainability-related aspects as central 
bank objectives and about half of the central banks have mandates that explicitly refer to 
supporting government economic policy or economic development either as a primary or as 
a secondary objective.
In most advanced economies, central banks have a relatively narrow mandate in 
relation to sustainable growth, either because it is secondary and subordinate to the main 
objective, or because it is not expressly stated. That explains why they are somewhat 
cautious in the use of prudential or monetary policy tools to support green finance for 
reasons other than prudential or financial stability considerations. By contrast, a good 
number of developing and emerging economies, central bank mandates are broader and 
include sustainability, and social and economic objectives. This is reflected in the fact 
that the central banks of many developing and emerging economies have been 
comparatively more active in promoting green finance and sustainable development, as 
analysed below.
5.4 What central banks are doing
In the last years, central banks have launched several initiatives to incorporate climate 
change matters into their actions. This means that central banks are working on different 
areas, such as the analysis of exposures of the financial system to those sectors that 
will be more affected by climate-change risks, the development of climate stress tests 
and supervisory expectations, and the incorporation of sustainable and responsible 
principles in the management of their own portfolios, as are collected in this section and 
in Table 3. 
Between the first steps that various institutions have taken is to carry on the 
analysis of the exposure of the financial system of their countries to climate change 
risks and, in particular, to the sectors most affected by the transition to a low-carbon 
economy. In this respect, the European Central Bank (ECB), in ECB (2019), analyses 
the channels through which climate change may affect financial stability and exposure 
of euro area financial institutions to certain sectors. It concludes that the exposure to 
transition risks, although fairly contained in relative terms, could be significant for some 
banks in absolute terms. It also points out limitations regarding the lack of exhaustive 
and comparable data, evidencing the need for more information on carbon emissions and 
exposures of banks and other financial institutions and for the performance of scenario 
analysis and/or stress test exercises to address transition risk in a forward-looking 
manner (ECB, 2019). 
The Bank of England (BoE), Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR) in 
France, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) in the Netherlands, the Swedish supervisory authority 
Finansinspektionen, Banco de España and the Central Bank of Belgium have also undertaken 
work to ascertain the level of exposure to climate change risks of the corresponding financial 
system. Thus the BoE and, specifically, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) have 
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conducted various analyses of the banking and insurance sectors and have carried on 
consultations to these sectors86 to obtain information on how they are being affected and 
how they are dealing with the issues; the main results were described in section 4. In France, 
the work by the ACPR found that physical risks continue to be considered as moderate by 
most of the institutions surveyed, since their exposures are concentrated in less exposed 
areas. There was some slight progress in banks’ management of transition risks. Thus, the 20 
most carbon-intensive sectors accounted for 12.2% of credit risk exposures in December 2017, 
although there were differences among banks.87 On its part, DNB performed various studies to 
analyse exposure to physical risks and transition risks. The largest losses from physical risks 
may arise from flooding. Exposures to carbon-intensive sectors were found to account for 11% 
of the balance sheet of banks, 12.4% of that of pension funds and 4.5% of that of insurance 
companies (see Regelink et al. (2017)). In the case of the Swedish financial sector is less exposed 
to climate-related risks than other parts of the world, according to Finansinspektionen (2016). For 
the Spanish banking sector, Delgado (2019), Deputy Governor Banco de España, founds that 
exposures to the potentially most affected sectors by an energy-transition represent around 
25% of the portfolio of loans for productive activities. Banco de España is also working 
to incorporate climate-related matters into its assessment of risks for the banking system 
as a whole and, in general, to incorporate all the recommendations issued by the NGFS 
for central banks.88 The National Bank of Belgium has analysed the climate-change-related 
transition risk associated with real estate exposures in the Belgian financial sector (see Van 
Tendeloo (2020)). Finally, Bank of Canada has announced plans for a pilot project on climate 
change scenarios applied to a small group of voluntaries with the aim of achieve a better 
understanding of the risks for the financial system.89
Some central banks have also begun to implement climate stress tests of their 
financial systems.90 For example, the DNB conducted in 2018 a stress test exercise for 
transition risks with a five-year horizon. It considers four possible scenarios regarding the 
implementation of policies designed to mitigate the adverse impact of climate change and 
technological advances to reduce CO2 emissions.
91 The Bank of England will integrate climate 
scenarios with macroeconomic and financial models and will incorporate physical and 
transition risks into its stress tests and it will be part of the 2021 Climate Biennial Exploratory 
Scenario (Bank of England, 2019, 2021b). Banque de France has developed a framework 
for a climate pilot exercise focused on transition risks that takes into account the scenarios 
developed by the NGFS (Allen et al., 2020). Relying on this approach, the ACPR, the French 
Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority, selected a number of quantitative scenarios 
86  For the insurance sector, see Bank of England (2015). For the banking sector, see Bank of England (2018) and the 
consultation in 2018 by the Prudential Regulation Authority in “Consultation Paper on ‘Enhancing banks’ and insurers’ 
approaches to managing the financial risks from climate change”.
87  For more details, see ACPR (2019a) and an earlier analysis by DG Trésor, Banque de France and ACPR (2017), which 
assessed physical and transition risks.
88  See González (2021b) for more details.
89  See Bank of Canada (2021).
90  See Chart 16 in ESRB and ECB (2021) for a list of European Union institutions that are putting in place climate stress 
tests and sensitivity analysis.
91  See Vermeulen et al. (2018) for more details of the impact.
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to be submitted to a group of voluntary banks and insurance companies to conduct the first 
bottom-up pilot climate-related risk assessment (ACPR, 2020). According to ACPR (2021), 
the pilot exercise revealed an overall moderate exposure of French banks and insurers to 
climate risks, although there are several uncertainties concerning both the speed and the 
impact of climate change. Danmarks National Bank (2020) has recently performed a first 
exercise of climate stress test focused on transition risks and performing several sensitivity 
analyses instead of a full-developed climate stress test, and Banco de España is developing 
the methodology for transition risks following the scenarios published by Aguilar et al. (2021).
At European level, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and ECB run 
a pilot stress test in 2020 (ESRB, 2020) and the ECB has developed the framework 
for an economy-wide climate stress test obtaining impact of climate change on more than 
four million firms worldwide and 1,600 euro area banks under three different climate policy 
scenarios (see De Guindos (2021) and Alogoskoufis et al. (2021)). ECB Banking Supervision 
will carry out separate supervisory climate stress-test of individual banks in 2022. In addition, 
the European Banking Authority (EBA) has developed a sensitivity analysis for transition risks 
as a pilot exercise on climate risk with a sample of voluntary European banks. The results show 
that it is needed a more harmonized approach and common metrics to address and mitigate 
the consequences of environmental risks. This analysis also obtains a first calculation of a EU 
aggregated “green asset ratio” to know the alignment of credit institutions’ balance sheets with 
the Taxonomy, and through a top-down tool this figure stands at 7.9% (see EBA (2021b)). 
From the supervisory area, the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
identified climate change risk as one of the risks to be monitored from a supervisory 
perspective in its risk assessment and priorities for 2019 and 202092 (SSM, 2018, 2019) 
and in 2021 supervisory activity will also focus on action taken by banks in response to the 
ECB Guide on climate-related and environmental risk (SSM, 2021). The EBA is working on 
its own action plan on sustainable finance to give a response to the mandate that received 
to cover ESG related factors and ESG risks, although the first phase of work will focus on 
environmental factors and especially climate change. Some of the last works has been: 
a EU-wide pilot exercise on climate risk, the publication of a report on management and 
supervision of ESG risks for credit institutions and investment firms, a public consultation 
on draft technical standards on Pillar 3 disclosures of ESG risks, the advice to the EC on 
Key Performance Indicators for transparency on institutions’ environmentally sustainable 
activities, including a green asset ratio, recommendations on the application of the Regulation 
on sustainability-related disclosures. 
In 2020, the ECB published its supervisory expectations that describes through 
eleven expectations how the institution expects banks to consider climate-related and 
environmental risks relating to: i) business models and strategy, ii) governance and risk 
appetite, iii) risk management and iv) disclosures (see ECB (2020d)). This guide is not binding 
92  In 2020 it is mentioned that climate change-related risks are more relevant over the longer-term horizon (i.e. a horizon 
of more than three years).
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but the expectations set out are to be used in the ECB’s supervisory dialogue with significant 
institutions directly supervised by the ECB. They have been developed jointly with the national 
competent authorities (NCAs). Banco de España published in October 2020 supervisory 
expectations for the less significant institutions around the same areas pointed out by ECB’s 
document. These expectations are not binding and are not subject to the “comply or explain” 
principle. The Banco de España expects the content of expectations to be considered in a 
proportionate manner (Banco de España, 2020). Other central banks that has elaborated 
supervisory expectations are, for example, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority 
(BaFin), DNB, Banco de Portugal and UK Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA).
Furthermore, more and more central banks are incorporating ESG factors and 
Sustainable and Investment principles in the management of their own portfolios, as 
pointed out before. The NGFS conducted in 2019 a first overview of the strategies applied among 
its members, indicating that 25 out of 27 respondents have already adopted sustainable and 
responsible investment (SRI) principles or are planning to do so in their investment approaches 
(see NGFS (2019c)). One year later, SRI practices have been adopted in 67% of the central 
banks surveyed, and for another 21%, this step is being considered (see NGFS (2020d)). Some 
of the central banks that are incorporating these SRI principles are: 
— The Eurosystem agreed in February 2021 a common stance for applying 
sustainable and responsible investment principles in the euro-denominated 
non-monetary policy portfolios that they each manage under their own 
responsibility (see ECB (2021b)).
— Banco de España applies, since 2019, sustainable and investment principles 
as part of its investment policy in respect of its own portfolios, the Banco 
de España has direct green bond investments in different currencies and 
participates in the open-ended investment funds for US dollar-denominated 
and euro-denominated green bonds launched by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) (see Banco de España (2021a)). 
— Banca d’Italia adapted the investment policy for its own funds by integrating ESG 
criteria for its internally managed equity portfolios (see Bernardini et al.  (2021) 
and Banca d’Italia (2021)).
— Bank of Ireland takes into account ESG criteria in the management of shares 
and is preparing to do so for bonds (see Lane (2019)).
— Banque de France published its first annual Responsible Investment Report in 2019 
where explains that its responsible investment strategy is organized around three 
pillars: i) align investments with France’s climate commitment, ii) ESG criteria in 
asset management, iii) exercise its right to vote and influence issuers (Banque de 
France, 2019). In the annual reports published in 2020 and 2021 more details and 
comparisons are included (see Banque de France (2020, 2021)). 
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— Bank of Finland considers, since 2019, climate risk management as key focus 
area in its responsibility programme, and has signed the UN-backed Principles 
for Responsible Investment (PRI). 
— The DNB published in 2019 its Responsible Investment Charter with the policy 
applied based on five commitments: i) screen, ii) integrate, iii) promote, iv) report 
and v) develop (see DNB (2019)). In 2019, DNB signed the Principles of Responsible 
Investment (PRI) for its own portfolios and foreign exchange reserves. 
— The Norges Bank applies exclusion criteria93 in investments of the government 
pension fund managed by it and Swiss National Bank also applies exclusion 
criteria in share purchases and the exercise of voting rights at annual and 
extraordinary meetings.94 
— Finally, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) from Hungary created a green bond 
portfolio as part of its Green Programme. 
— Banco de México incorporated SRI considerations within the fixed-income 
holdings in its own portfolios, including debt issued by supranational 
organisations, government-sponsored entities, and corporations. The central 
bank considers in its investment decisions environmental elements, as well as 
ESG and negative screening.
Regarding monetary policy, some central banks have started to develop specific 
programmes in monetary policy frameworks. For example, MNB has implemented 
environmental considerations in its monetary policy toolkit considering that sustainability 
considerations can be derived from the primary goal of the MNB and are also consistent with 
the additional mandates set out in the Central Bank Act, such as achieving and maintaining 
price stability.95 Bank of England is revisiting its monetary policy framework to include 
climate change considerations.96 Riksbank only purchases bonds issued by companies 
deemed to comply with international standards and norms for sustainability, so-called 
norm-based negative screening, since January 2021.97 In July 2021, Bank of Japan (BoJ) 
launched a new funding provisioning program by the end on this year under which the 
central bank of Japan will provide funds to financial institutions against investment or loans 
they make to address climate change based on their own decisions. Eligible counterparties 
will be financial institutions that disclose a certain level of information on their efforts to 
address climate change of the investment/loans made by counterparties as part of their 
93  The fund does not invest in companies making certain types of weapons, belonging to the coal sector or producing 
tobacco or in those engaging in activities which contravene basic human rights. See Norges Bank (2018).
94  “The SNB also avoids shares in companies which produce internationally banned weapons, seriously violate 
fundamental human rights or systematically cause severe environmental damage” (SNB, 2015).
95   See MNB (2021).
96   See section 5.2 and BoE (2021a).
97   See Riksbank (2021).
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efforts, those that contribute to Japan’s actions to address climate change. The Bank will 
purchase foreign currency-denominated green bonds issued by governments and other foreign 
institutions based on the existing management principles.98
In the case of emerging and developing countries, a broader range of tools is 
being used. For example, credit allocation policies are used by the Bangladesh Bank, which 
has set up various green finance facilities for investments in specific sectors such as, for 
example, water, energy use and textiles. Under this regulation, commercial banks and non-
bank financial institutions have to assign 5% of their total loan portfolio to green sectors.99 
Moreover, Bangladesh Bank published Policy Guidelines for Green Banking in 2011 and the 
Environmental Risk Management (ERM) Guidelines in 2012 that were upgraded and replaced 
in February 2017 to include social risk.100 The central bank of Mongolia is developing and 
implementing the sustainable finance framework and issued in 2015 an official directive 
requiring all banks to report on the implementation of the Principles in their annual reports. 
The Reserve Bank of India extended its “RBI’s Priority Sector Lending” in 2015 to include 
social infrastructure and renewable energy projects in the list of priority sectors to which 
commercial banks must grant 40% of net commercial bank credit.101 The Banco Central do 
Brasil also imposes restrictions on credit in environmentally sensitive areas of the Amazon. 
Furthermore, it requires commercial banks to incorporate environmental and social criteria 
into stress tests and to include such risks in capital requirements.102 In 2020 elaborated 
a sustainability agenda with the objective to incorporate climate risk and other elements 
of sustainable finance in the reserves management, the study of the potential creation of a 
“Green Liquidity Facility”, in supervision, regulation.103 In April 2021, launched two public 
consultations on two regulations, one related to risk management and social, environmental 
and climate responsibility and other on the disclosure of social, environmental, and climate-
related risks by financial institutions.104
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has implemented various “green” tools in recent 
years, likewise in cooperation with other agencies. These include a Green Credit Policy, 
a database containing detailed information, voluntary Green Credit Guidelines for banks, 
collateral policies and reserve requirements. It is also considering green finance facilities 
for commercial banks105 and in 2015 issued a green bond catalogue usually referred as 
taxonomy.106 An updated Green Bonds Endorsed Projects Catalogue was released in 2021. 
The PBOC has a policy of promoting green finance through monetary policy (NGFS, 2018). 
In 2016, the PBOC, together with other ministries, published the Guidelines for Establishing 
 98   See Bank of Japan (2021).
 99   For more details, see Dikau and Volz (2018) and Dikau and Ryan-Collins (2017).
100   See IFC (2020).
101   It is also being considered including environmental risks when assessing agricultural prices in the analysis of financial 
and monetary stability. For more details, see Dikau and Ryan-Collins (2017) and Dikau and Volz (2018).
102   In line with Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP)/Basel Accords Pillar 2. See Dikau and Ryan-
Collins (2017).
103  For more details, see Banco Central do Brasil (2020).
104  See Banco Central do Brasil (2021a and 2021b).
105  For more details, see Dikau and Volz (2018).
106  For a greater detail about this taxonomy, see OECD (2020).
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a Green Financial System. It has put in place policies on green bonds, green credit and 
environmental information disclosure. PBOC is considering the possibility to stablish 
mandatory disclosure requirements for financial institutions (Gang, 2020). 
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6 Conclusions
The commitments acquired under the Paris agreement will involve the launch of numerous 
policies aimed at preventing global temperatures from increasing and consequently staving 
off climate change. The financial system will play a significant role in this process for two 
reasons. The first is the role it plays in the flow of funds from savers to borrowers, thereby 
facilitating the investment needed for the transition to a low-carbon economy. And the 
second is that the effects of climate change and of the transition entail financial risks.
Regarding the need for funds, green finance instruments have emerged and, in 
particular, the issuance of green bonds has increased considerably in the last three years, 
their outstanding volume amounting to around $1.1 trillion in September 2021. However, the 
issuance of green instruments represents only a small part of total bond issuance (around 5%). 
Moreover, the valuation of carbon intensive assets is generally misaligned, giving rise to an 
inappropriate allocation of resources to the detriment of green finance. 
Climate change-related financial risks, physical risks and transition risks, are not 
independent of one another. The fewer the mitigating policies and actions implemented, 
the greater the physical risks, and vice versa. That said, the worst scenario is that of a late 
and disorderly transition, when it is already late to avoid the materialisation of physical risks. 
What is more, their characteristics make them more difficult to assess: broad scope, long 
and undefined time horizon, foreseeable occurrence and dependence on actions taken now 
by agents, i.e. they are endogenous. Physical and transition risks are, furthermore, of a 
systemic nature. However, the systemic scope of these risks will be lower if there is an early 
and orderly transition to a low-carbon economy which allows economic agents to adapt 
adequately. By contrast, a late and sudden transition has notable systemic consequences, 
since not only will there be the economic consequences of the materialisation of physical 
risks, but systemic shocks involving sudden unexpected changes in the value of numerous 
assets will also ensue. The political complexity of the economic policy decision-making 
needed for an orderly transition means that the probability of a scenario of late and disorderly 
transition is significant.
The business opportunities offered by the transition to a low-carbon economy and 
the physical and transition financial risks associated with climate change particularly involve 
and affect financial institutions. As key financial intermediaries, banks are essential actors 
in the financing of a low-carbon economy. Physical and transition risks give rise, inter alia, 
to credit and market risks, affecting bank balance sheets. Therefore, banks have to manage 
climate change-related factors outside the framework of corporate social responsibility, 
integrating them into the strategy of their main business and furnishing public information 
on their exposure.
The mandates and responsibilities of central banks regarding financial stability 
and, where applicable, banking supervision make it necessary for central banks to take 
into consideration climate change-related factors in their micro- and macro-prudential 
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supervisory work and in their economic forecasts. Moreover, climate related risks would 
also affect price stability, the transmission of monetary policy and the balance sheet of 
central banks. Central banks are analysing how to incorporate climate change aspects in 
the monetary policy framework and how to apply sustainable and responsible investment 
practices in the management of their own portfolios. The implications of climate change 
also prompt central banks to support the financing of the green economy insofar as the 
achievement of a low-carbon economy through an orderly transition, lessens, as noted 
above, the risks to financial stability. In this respect, central banks must not be economic 
policymakers, which is the sole responsibility of governments; rather, they must evaluate 
whether their asset purchases, collateral policy and prudential regulation are causing 
climate-related risks not to be reflected adequately in asset prices, with the consequent 
adverse effects for financial stability. Should this be so, they should have to act accordingly, 
albeit always within their mandate. 
In recent years, investors, financial institutions and central banks have made 
headway in the incorporation of climate-related matters into their decisions and actions. 
First, in the public arena, the European Commission has been working on developing 
several specific regulations about disclosure, climate indices or environmental classification 
of activities and continues under the European Green Deal and the Renewed Sustainable 
Finance Strategy. The International Platform on Sustainable Finance is a multilateral forum 
of dialogue between policymakers to promote best practices, compare their different 
initiatives and identify barriers and opportunities of sustainable finance. From the private 
sector, banks have increased their commitment through several initiatives such as those 
under UNEP Fi, such as Principles for Sustainable Finance, Collective Commitment to Climate 
Action and more recently the Net Zero Banking-Alliance. In the vein, the number of asset owners 
and investment managers that have signed the Principles for Responsible Investment have 
increased in the last years and the incorporation of SRI investment criteria has increased 
significantly. In the case of central banks, the progress has been also remarkable. The 
launch of the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System 
at the end of 2017, pushed the work of them in relation to contribute to combating climate 
change and promoting sustainable finance. Currently, central banks are working on the 
potential impact of climate change in monetary policy, the application of SRI principles 
in the management of their own portfolios, the assessment of the risks for the financial 
systems, climate stress tests and supervisory expectations. Against this background, the 
ECB announced in July 2021 a comprehensive action plan to urther incorporate, within its 
mandate, climate change considerations into its monetary policy framework.
The progress made in the last few years have been remarkable but even greater 
progress is necessary. It is no easy task and there are numerous challenges to overcome. 
These include the lack of public information from firms and financial institutions on exposures, 
the lack of common definitions, for example a broad taxonomy that defines from green 
to brown, the lack of comparable data, and the underdeveloped state of methodologies 
incorporating climate-related, macroeconomic and financial factors, and the interactions 
between them. This task also requires adopting a long-term approach in decision-making 
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and in the assessment of risks and impacts. In this respect, the publication of different 
regulations put in place by the European Commission, such as the EU regulation on 
taxonomy or the EU Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, the commitment to adopt 
the TCFD recommendations by numerous financial institutions, the NGFS’s efforts to increase 
awareness developing the framework in which central banks incorporate climate-related 
issues in their agendas, as well as the work of individual central banks, and the progress in 
academic circles, are all welcome news. The road is long and we have no time to lose.
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Box 1
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (TCFD)
2015 saw the creation of the Task Force on Climate Related 
Financial Disclosures (TCFD) led by the industry to foster the 
effectiveness and consistency of voluntary disclosures on risks and 
opportunities associated with climate change. 
In 2017 the TCFD published its recommendations on disclosures on 
climate-related financial risks for companies and entities to provide 
information to lenders, insurers, investors and other interested 
parties (see TCFD (2017)). These recommendations are voluntary 
and aimed at the provision of consistent, comparable, reliable and 
clear information structured in eleven disclosure elements of four 
thematic areas: governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics 
and targets.
The support for the TCFD has grown remarkably since the 
launch of the recommendations, with 1924 companies and other 
organizations committing their support to March 2021. Among 
them, 957 are from the financial sector (of which, 139 are banks 
and 518 asset managers), 7 central banks (Belgium, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Morocco, Netherlands, Singapore and United Kingdom), 
26 supervisors and regulators and 15 governments. Spain has 34 
signatories, among them 7 banks. 
The last Status Report of the TCFD (TCFD, 2020) reviewed 
1700 public companies to determine whether their reports 
include information aligned with TCFD recommendations. The 
report recognizes that climate-related disclosure has improved 
significantly since 2017, but its alignment with recommendations 
remains low (see last column of above table). Areas for which the 
percentage of reviewed companies with TCFD aligned disclosure 
is 25% or below are the ones related with board oversight, risk 
management and resilience of strategy. For this last area, the report 
found that the percentage of companies disclosing the resilience 
of their strategies (a 7%), taking into consideration different 
climate-related scenarios, including a 2°C or lower scenario, was 
significantly lower than that of any other recommended disclosure. 
The report also found that disclosures are primarily made in 
sustainability reports.
TCFD has developed pilot exercises joined with UNEP FI for 
banks, insurers and investors. In the case of banks there have 
been two phases. The first one (2017-2018) was focused on the 
development of transition and physical assessment models and 
metrics to enable scenario-based, forward-looking assessment 
and disclosure of climate-related risks and opportunities. Phase II 
(2019-2021) focused on the four pillars of TCFD disclosures and 
how to establish good practices across the financial sector. Finally, 
in January 2021 has started phase III to explore more climate stress 
testing, the integration of physical and transition risk assessments, 
and sector-specific risks and opportunities.
SOURCE: TCFD. 2020 Status Report.
TCFD recommendation by thematic area Disclosure elements




    Disclose the organization's gobernance around climate-related risks 
    and opportunities
a)  Board Oversight




    Disclose the actual and potential impacts of climate-related risks 
    and opportunities on the organization's businesses, strategy, and
    financial planning where such information is material 
a)  Risks and Opportunities
b)  Impact on Organization





    Disclose how the organization identifies, assesses, and manages 
    climate-related risks
a)  Risk ID and Assessment Processes
b)  Risk Management





    Disclose the metrics and targets used to assess and manage 
    relevant climate-related risks and opportunities where such 
    information is material
a)  Climate-Related Metrics
b)  Scope 1, 2, 3 GHG Emissions
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Recuadro X
TÍTULO RECUADRO 1 LÍNEA
Box 2
OBSTACL S AND CHA LENGES TO PROGRESS 
The advance of green finance, the factoring-in by banks of climate-
related opportunities and risks and the inclusion of climate change 
matters in micro- and macro-prudential supervision by central 
banks has been notable, although much remains to be done. To 
press ahead, it will be necessary to overcome a series of obstacles 
and challenges, some of which are behind the widespread 
perception that asset prices do not adequately reflect climate 
risks, particularly transition risk. And that, in turn, gives rise to an 
inefficient allocation of financial resources and has adverse effects 
on financial stability.
These obstacles include most notably:
—  Insufficient public information. Without public information 
on exposures to climate-related financial risks, it is not 
possible to accurately value the impact of climate change 
on financial assets and prevent inefficient allocation of 
resources. This public information is crucial for firms, 
investors and consumers to take appropriate decisions, 
for banks to value their exposures, for governments to 
draft policies and for supervisors to assess impacts on 
the financial system. In addition, this information has to be 
disseminated in a harmonised fashion at international level. 
In this respect, the recommendations formulated by the 
TCFD and their implementation guide mark an advance.
—  Common taxonomy. Many of the actions to be carried 
out by investors, banks and supervisors need a taxonomy 
with standard criteria at global level to distinguish what 
is “green” and what is “brown”. The EU regulation on 
taxonomy is a step forward, but unfortunately it only 
encompasses “green” activities.
—  Time lag between action and impact (the tragedy 
of the horizon). The impact of climate change-related 
risks will occur beyond the decision horizon of investors, 
banks, supervisors and other agents. Nevertheless, the 
future impact depends on the actions taken today. This 
time lag induces a lack of perception and consciousness 
of the risks associated with climate change. A long-term 
perspective by all agents is needed so that the decisions 
made today take into consideration their future impact.
—  Lack of adequate methodologies. The assessment of 
climate-related risks requires methodologies based on 
forward-looking scenarios, with complex cause-effect 
interactions between climate-economy-financial sector, 
and on data which have not been observed in the past. 
As noted by the Network for Greening the Financial System 
(NGFS), the tools and methodologies for assessing 
climate-related financial risks are still incipient, albeit 
developing briskly.
—  Lack of data. The limited availability of data reduces the 
ability of supervisors and financial institutions to properly 
assess risks. Access to data at individual asset level with 
granular information on the issuer’s sector of activity is 
particularly limited.
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Box 3
RECOMM ND TIONS OF THE NETWORK FOR GREENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (NGFS)
In April 2019 the NGFS issued six recommendations which will 
hopefully inspire central banks and supervisors, whether NGFS 
members or not, and other financial system participants to take 
the necessary measures to promote a greener financial system 
(see NGFS (2019b)). They are not compulsory and reflect the best 
practices identified by NGFS members to facilitate the role of the 
financial sector in achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement. 
Specifically, the six recommendations are as follows: 
1  Integrating climate-related risks into financial stability 
monitoring and micro-supervision. The purpose of 
this recommendation is to assess risks by identifying 
transmission channels, adopting risk indicators and 
conducting quantitative analyses. 
2  Integrating sustainability factors into own-portfolio 
management. Central banks are encouraged to lead 
by example in their own operations. Notwithstanding 
institutional differences, this entails integrating sustainability 
factors into the management of some of their portfolios, 
such as own funds, pension funds and reserves.
3  Bridging the data gaps. Authorities are recommended 
to share data and, wherever possible, make them 
publicly available.
4  Building awareness and intellectual capacity and 
encouraging technical assistance and knowledge-
sharing. The NGFS encourages central banks, supervisors 
and financial institutions to build in-house capacity and to 
collaborate within their institutions, with each other and 
with wider stakeholders to improve their understanding of 
how climate-related factors translate into financial risks 
and opportunities.
5  Achieving robust and internationally consistent 
climate and environment-related disclosure. The NGFS 
emphasises the importance of a disclosure framework and 
supports the recommendations of the TCFD. 
6  Supporting the development of a taxonomy of 
economic activities. This recommendation aims to 
enhance the transparency in respect of economic 
activities which i) contribute to the transition to a green 
and low-carbon economy and ii) are more exposed to 
climate-related risks (both physical and transition).
The first four recommendations apply to the work of central banks 
and supervisors, while the last two are aimed more at policymakers 
to facilitate the work of central banks and supervisors. The NGFS 
published in 2019, 2020 and 2021 reports on: i) a sustainable 
and responsible investment guide for central banks’ portfolio 
management, ii) a guide for supervisors: integrating climate-
related and environmental risks into prudential supervision, iii) a 
status report on financial institutions’ practices with respect to 
risk differential between green, non-green and brown financial 
assets and a potential risk differential, iv) NGFS climate scenarios 
for central banks and supervisors, v) a guide to climate scenario 
analysis for central banks and supervisors, vi) initial takeaways on 
climate change and monetary policy and how it is incorporated in 
their frameworks, vii) an examination of the implications of climate 
change for central banks’ operational frameworks and for the 
implementation of monetary policy in practical terms, viii) research 
priorities on the macroeconomic and financial stability impacts of 
climate change, ix) an overview of the environmental risk analysis 
done by financial institutions, x) a report on sustainable finance 
market dynamics and a dashboard with indicators, and xi) a 
progress report on bridging data gaps.
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Box 4
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK’S ROADMAP FOR INCORPORATING CLIMATE CONSIDERATIONS INTO ITS MONETARY 
POLICY STRATEGY
The Governing Council of the European Central Bank announced on 
July 8, 2021 its roadmap for incorporating climate considerations 
into its monetary policy framework (see ECB (2021a)). Climate and 
environmental sustainability issues have featured prominently in the 
review of the strategy conducted in 2020 and 2021. Recognizing 
that governments and parliaments have the primary responsibility 
to act on climate change, the ECB establishes, within its mandate 
and in line with its obligations under the European Union Treaties, 
a set of actions to incorporate climate considerations into its 
monetary policy framework. The design of the necessary measures 
will be consistent with the objective of price stability and should 
take into account the implications of climate change for an efficient 
allocation of resources. Specifically, the areas of work between 
2021 and 2024 are going to be:
—  Macroeconomic modeling and assessment of the 
implications for monetary policy transmission. 
The work will be carried out in two phases, first, between 
2021 and 2022 technical assumptions on carbon 
pricing will be introduced to forecast and regularly assess 
the impact of related fiscal policies. Then, between 
2022 and 2024, climate risks will be integrated into the 
models by assessing their impact on potential growth, 
scenario analyses will be carried out in terms of transition 
policies and analysis of implications for monetary policy 
transmission.
—  Statistical data for risk analysis. New indicators will 
be developed on green financial instruments, financial 
institutions’ exposures to physical risks through their 
portfolios, as well as on the carbon footprint of their 
portfolios.
—  Introduction of disclosure requirements for private 
sector assets as a new eligibility criterion or as a basis 
for differentiated treatment for the purposes of their 
presentation as collateral and asset purchases. Ongoing 
EU initiatives on disclosure, as well as proportionality, will 
be taken into account. A detailed plan will be announced 
in 2022.
—  Improved risk assessment capabilities. From 2022, 
the ECB will conduct climate stress tests on the whole 
Eurosystem balance sheet based on the pilot exercise 
conducted in 2021 to the economy. Disclosures by CRAs 
eligible for the Eurosystem credit assessment system will 
also be assessed and the ECB will consider developing 
minimum criteria for the incorporation of climate risks in 
its internal ratings.
—  Collateral framework. The ECB will consider relevant 
climate change risks when reviewing the valuation and risk 
control frameworks for assets mobilised as collateral by 
counterparties for Eurosystem credit operations. The ECB 
will also continue to monitor structural changes in the 
markets for sustainability products to support innovation 
in sustainable finance within the scope of its mandate. 
One example is the decision to accept Sustainability 
Linked Bonds with objectives subject to environmental 
sustainability criteria as collateral (see ECB (2020c)).
—  Corporate sector asset purchases. The ECB has already 
started to take climate risks into account in due diligence 
procedures for corporate sector asset purchases for its 
monetary policy portfolios. Looking ahead, the ECB will 
adjust the framework guiding the allocation of corporate 
bond purchases to incorporate climate change criteria, in 
line with its mandate. In the first quarter of 2023, the ECB 
will start disclosing climate-related information of the 
corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP).
All this actions will be done taking into account the progress made 
in the European Union in terms of information disclosure, such as 
the proposed Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, as well 
as the Taxonomy Regulation and the Regulation on the disclosure of 
information related to sustainability in the financial services sector.
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AEB Spanish Banking Association 
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
CECA Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks 
COP Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
CSRD Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive 
EBA European Banking Authority 
ECB European Central Bank 
EIOPA European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
ESG Environmental, Social, Governance 
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority 
EUGBS European green bond standard 
FC4S Financial Centres for Sustainability network 
FINRESP Spanish Centre for Responsible and Sustainable Finance 
HLEG High-Level Expert Group 
INVERCO Spanish Association of Collective Investment Schemes and Pension Funds 
IPSF International Platform on Sustainable Finance 
NFRD Non-Financial Reporting Directive 
NGEU Next Generation EU 
NGFS Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System 
PRI Principles for Responsible Investment 
RSFS Renewed Sustainable Finance Strategy 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
SRI Sustainable and Responsible Investment
TCFD Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 
TEG Technical Expert Group 
TNFD Task Force on Nature-related Financial Disclosures 
UNACC Spanish Association of Credit Cooperatives 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNEP FI United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative 
UNESPA Spanish Association of Insurers and Reinsurers 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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